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PUNISHING SEX OFFENDERS:

When Good

Intentions Go Bad
t
Michael Vitiello

I.

INTRODUCTION

Seldom has an aspect of the criminal law changed as dramatically as has
the law governing sexual offenders. The past twenty-five years have
witnessed two developments, one expanding the scope of rape law,' the
other increasing criminal penalties and civil disabilities for sexual
predators.2 Largely independent, these developments are now on a collision
course, the product of unseen consequences of good intentions.
Let me explain. Today, commentators debate whether the reform of rape
law has gone far enough.3 But the law has changed considerably since the
1970s when women faced practical and legal hurdles. Many hesitated to
report rape because of police insensitivity.' If the case went to trial, many
criminal defense lawyers aggressively cross-examined them on their prior
sexual histories, even in cases of stranger rape where consent was at best
wildly improbable. 5 Further, the formal elements of rape made prosecution
and conviction unlikely in many cases of unwanted sexual intercourse if the
t
Distinguished Professor and Scholar, Pacific McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to
Professor Michael A. Berch of the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State
University and my two excellent research assistants, Cameron Desmond and Oona Mallett, for
their help in researching and footnoting this Article.
1. See infra Part II.
2.

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW, at ix, 10 (1998). Part of the problem is cultural and not legal. That is,

3.

even when the criminal law has expanded to allow the conviction of an actor, "[s]ocial attitudes
are tenacious, and they can easily nullify the theories and doctrines found in the law books." Id.
at 17; see also Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 409, 410 (1998)
("[F]eminists can take legitimate pride in the fact that rape law has undergone significant reform
in just the past decade or two, largely as a result of their efforts.").
4.

See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 175 (1975);

SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 25; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1168-69 (1986).
5.
See SUSAN GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE ALL-AMERICAN CRIME, RAMPARTS 26 (1971); Vivian
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 14 (1977).
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woman did not resist with her own sufficient force.6 Special evidentiary
requirements increased the burden on the State to prove rape, for example,
by requiring independent evidence corroborating that a rape had taken
place.7 Even the Model Penal Code, largely viewed as a great
accomplishment, 8 retained spousal immunity from rape,9 leaving women
victimized by their husbands with little recourse.
Much of that has changed. Many large city police departments have
specialized rape units, with officers trained to aid rape victims.'0 Rape
shield laws have limited the scope of cross examination in many cases,
often protecting a woman from having to reveal her prior sexual history."
States have largely abandoned spousal immunity.' 2 Legislatures have added
various sexual misconduct statutes that protect a woman's autonomy even
when the male's conduct would not have amounted to rape under its
common law definition.13 Finally, some courts have expanded the definition
of rape through statutory construction, sometimes straining the language to
modernize the crime.' 4 Many of these reforms are widely recognized as
needed.
As developed below, some expansions of rape law are more
controversial, making conduct criminal without the same mens rea usually
6.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

CRIMINAL LAW

4

COMMENTARIES

*210;

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING

627-28 (4th ed. 2006).

7.
See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8.
Cf DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 33 ("Many criminal law professors treat the Model
Penal Code as 'the principal text in criminal law teaching,' because its influence on the law has
been so dramatic.").
9.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980).
10. E.g., NYPD Detective Bureau Organization, http://www.homicidesquad.com/
nypd_detective-bureau organization.htm#Central%20lnvestigation%20and%20Resource%20D
ivision (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (detailing the smaller unit within the local police department
dedicated to sex crimes); Special Victims Unit, Oakland Police Department,
http://www.oaklandpolice.com/geninfo/specvic.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (same);
Victim's Assistance-City of Detroit Departments, http://www.ci.detroit.mi.us/Departments/
PoliceDepartment/VictimsAssistance/tabid/1928/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2008)
(same).
11. See, e.g., State v. Detonancour, 2001 MT 213, 24, 306 Mont. 389, 24, 34 P.3d487,
24; State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1215-17 (N.H. 1988); State v. Thompson, 884 P.2d 574,
575-78 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347, 356-60 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
12. For a review of the spreading abolition of the spousal immunity rule, see Michelle J.
Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law on
Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1485-96 (2003).
13. See statutes cited infra notes 55-56, 85, 98, 102.
14. See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (interpreting the statutory
element of "physical force" to be satisfied merely by the force "inherent in the act of sexual
penetration" and finding, despite the absence of language in the statute, a requirement of
"affirmative and freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration").
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required for the conviction of a serious felony. 5 The justice system might
deal with a few minor excesses in the law of rape, but it is unable to
compensate for the largely independent development in the law dealing
with sexual offenders that has taken place. 6
That major development is the host of laws governing sexually violent
predators. Megan's Law and Jessica's Law are the two most prominent
examples. 7 In addition to severe criminal sentences for the underlying
crimes, these laws have added registration requirements, GPS 8 tracking,
and civil commitment. 9 Legislatures have enacted these laws in response to
gruesome crimes, involving young victims and sexual predators with prior
histories of child molestation.2"
These laws are premised on a view of the sexual predator as incorrigible,
unable to control his conduct, and likely to repeat his predatory conduct if
released into the public without special monitoring.2 ' It is argued that long
15. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes.
16. Absent the largely independent developments (dealing with sexual predators), the
criminal law might adapt to a few excesses through, for example, prosecutorial discretion to
avoid unfair prosecutions, jury nullification, or the use of judicial discretion to avoid unfairness.
Laws dealing with sexual predators have increased the likelihood that sexual offenders will
receive increased punishment and other disabilities and cannot be addressed by the system.
17. Both federal versions of these laws fall under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Program. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000). There are different
state provisions for both Megan's and Jessica's laws in every state. I focus primarily on the
California provisions. California's sex offender registry provisions are located at California
Penal Code section 290.
18. Global Positioning Systems ("GPS") receive signals from satellites and triangulate
position based on the perceived distance and location of the satellites. Smithsonian National Air
and Space Museum, How Does GPS Work?, http://www.nasm.si.edu/gps/work.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2008). A GPS tracking system systematically records the positional information of the
GPS unit and transmits that information to a central database using a modem installed in the
GPS unit. Id.
19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 2008) (providing the registration
requirements); CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, CAL. GEN. ELECTION: OFFICIAL
VOTER

INFORMATION

GUIDE:

PROPOSITION

83:

SEX OFFENDERS.

SEXUALLY

VIOLENT

PREDATORS. PUNISHMENT, RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND MONITORING. INITIATIVE STATUTE.

43-44
(2006),
available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vigO6/general-06/pdf/
proposition_83/entire..prop83.pdf (providing for GPS tracking and changing the existing twoyear involuntary civil commitment for sexually violent predators to an indeterminate
commitment subject to annual review).
20. See David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The
Casefor More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 600, 604-07 (2006); Jason F. Mohan, Note, A Community's Response to a
Shocking Crime: The Jessica Lunsford Act and the Florida Sexual Offender Registry, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 703, 703-10 (2007) (denoting legislative responses to the sexual offenses
and murders perpetrated against children).
21. E.g., Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process,
Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1451, 1456-57
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prison sentences and additional civil disabilities are warranted by the
special risk created by these monsters.
Who can quarrel with these reforms, both those aimed at protecting
women and those protecting children? Most do not argue with the goals of
these reforms, but problems result from their breadth. As developed
below," some reforms of rape laws and the continued use of some historical
offenses (notably statutory rape) allow convictions of offenders with less
culpable mens rea than typically required for serious felonies. Further,
because reporting and other sexual offender laws are broadly drawn, they
often sweep those offenders within their provisions.23 In addition, the
premise justifying these laws, the idea that sex offenders are beyond
deterrence and reform, is false in many cases.
As a result, states often impose unnecessary hardship on past offenders,
who may be subject to a lifetime of disabilities,24 which cannot be justified
by the likelihood that they will re-offend. Apart from the obvious waste of
resources, the added disabilities are unfair and single out a group of
offenders for unequal treatment, not justified by any of the purposes for
which we impose punishment."
Thus, the expansion of criminal law governing sex offenders is a
cautionary tale about good intentions, legislation enacted in the heat of the
moment, and the enactment of piecemeal legislation governing criminal
sentences.26 The lessons are especially important for states like California
where some of these laws are enacted through an initiative process, leaving
less room for deliberation in their enactment.27
(1999) (contending that most sex offender registration laws are premised on the purportedly
high risk of recividivism and the portrayal of offenders as pedophiles, whereas the scope of the
laws is much broader in practice).
22. See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes.
23. See discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes.
24. For example, the continued need to register leaves former offenders open to new
criminal charges for minor technical offenses, such as the failure to reregister. In California, if
the underlying crime is a felony, failure to reregister can serve as a strike, and has the potential
of sending a felon to prison for life as a third strike. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF
JUSTICE,
SUMMARY
OF
STATE
SEX
OFFENDER
REGISTRIES
11
(2001),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sssor01st.pdf
25. See discussion infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
26. See discussion infra Part III and notes 119-128.
27. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2002), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR-report.pdf
("The initiative process, as it exists today, lacks some of the critical elements of the
representative system of government, including debate, deliberation, flexibility, compromise
and transparency."); Jennifer Drage, Taming the InitiativeBeast, ST. LEGISLATURES MAG., Sept.
2000, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/pubs/900init.htm ("Debate, deliberation and
compromise are noticeably absent from the initiative process.").
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Part II of this Article discusses the expansion of rape and sexual offender
laws over the past thirty years, focusing especially on cases that limit
offenders' ability to raise a defense of mistake as to consent or the age of
the victim. Part III traces the development of sexual predator statutes. Part
IV examines the ineffectiveness of sexual offender statutes and the
unfairness that can result by imposing stepped-up punishment on various
sex offenders. Part V concludes with some thoughts about criminal
sentencing reform.
II.

THE REINVIGORATION OF STATUTORY RAPE AND THE EXPANSION OF
THE DEFINITION OF RAPE

Few commentators would return to the historical limitations on the crime
of rape.2 8 That is in large part because the law of rape made successful
prosecution of violent offenders so difficult and provided women with such
limited protection, both of their bodies and their autonomy.2 9 But as
developed in this Part, even though reformers' motivations were noble, the
expansion of rape laws creates the potential for injustice.3" Further, the
reinvigoration of statutory rape raises additional concerns.3
Blackstone defined rape as "carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will."3 At common law, a husband could not be convicted of
raping his wife.33 Apart from statutory rape,3 4 rape required additional

28. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 3, at 418 ("Substantive rape law has changed, much of it
for the good ....
").I do not mean to suggest that all commentators agree that we have gone far
enough in reforming laws governing sexual misconduct. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at
1-2.
29. See Dressier, supra note 3, at 416-17 (indicating that the elemental requirements
necessary to support a rape conviction were "weighted against women").
30. See infra notes 85-86, 98-106, 111-13 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
32. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *2 10.
33. MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *628-29.
34. Statutory rape is the offense wherein a male has what would otherwise be consensual
sexual intercourse with a minor female. See generally Michelle Oberman, Regulating
ConsensualSex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703 (2000)
[hereinafter Oberman, Defining a Role for Statutory Rape]; Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls
into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15
(1994); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV.
387 (1984). Further, some jurisdictions have expanded rape to include intercourse with a
woman who was unconscious or asleep. See Aprz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(b) (2001)
(defining "without consent" under sexual offense law to include where "[t]he victim is
incapable of consent by reason of ... sleep"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(A) (West Supp.

2008).
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elements that made its prosecution difficult.35 In part, to guard against
fabricated claims of rape,36 jurisdictions often required additional elements,
like a requirement of prompt reporting,37 independent corroboration,38 and
perhaps most troubling, a requirement that the woman resist, and in some
39
jurisdictions, to the utmost.
It is important to note, however, that in many jurisdictions rape was a
capital offense; and especially in the South in cases of black on white
intercourse, the death penalty was enforced.4" Concerns about
proportionality4 and equality42 certainly justify limitations on rape as long
as it is graded as a capital or otherwise serious felony. Further, the
resistance requirement, even if not a formal element of the offense, provides
highly relevant evidence of a lack of consent and should rebut a claim of a
lack of mens rea in many cases. But, especially in light of the additional
difficulties in prosecuting rape cases, the law of rape left women with
severely limited protection in many cases that shock us today.4 3 Further, the
law did little to protect women's sexual autonomy."
While the Model Penal Code provisions on rape made modest
improvements over the historical rules,45 those provisions were not

35. As discussed above, other informal factors, like the insensitivity of the police, made
successful arrest and prosecution for rape exceedingly difficult. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 18; Dressier, supra note 3, at 416 (citing
judges' warnings to juries to take special care in evaluating the victim's testimony because "a
rape charge 'is easily made and once made, difficult to defend against even if the person
accused is innocent"' and indicating that the additional statutory requirements were imposed to
counteract this difficulty in rebutting the possibly false charge (quoting State v. Bashaw, 672
P.2d 48, 48 (Or. 1983)).
37. See Dressler, supra note 3, at 416 (citing the restriction of the Model Penal Code, and
several jurisdictions, to "bar[] rape prosecutions if the female did not notify public authorities
within a brief period of time after her assault").
38. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a person
suspected of rape could not be convicted "on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged
victim").
39. See Cascio v. State, 25 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Neb. 1947); Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536,
538 (Wis. 1906); Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W. 431, 433 (Wis. 1880).
40. James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases: Citation
Practicesand Their Implications, 8 JUST. Q. 421, 431 (1991).
41. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
42. See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 619 (contending that the death penalty was unequally
applied to black defendants found guilty of raping white women).
43. See, e.g., Wiley, 492 F.2d 547.
44. At least one scholar has argued that the law of rape was not concerned with a woman's
sexual autonomy. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
45. See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 646-49. Despite its reputation as an enlightened
approach to the criminal law, the Model Penal Code's sexual offenses provisions have few
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especially influential even in jurisdictions that adopted most of the Code.46
Instead, significant reforms began in the 1970s, largely in response to
efforts of feminist organizations and writers.47 Those reforms include the
elimination of the spousal immunity in many jurisdictions,48 the elimination
of special cautionary instructions and the corroboration requirement,49 and
the elimination of the requirement of resistance or, at least, the elimination
of the requirement of resistance to the utmost.5 ° Further, and most important
for this Article, in some instances reforms expanded the conduct that is
criminal51 and limited the mens rea requirements for rape.52 Those reforms
were sometimes the product of legislative enactment 53 or judicial
interpretation of existing rape law.54
Legislatures and courts have expanded laws dealing with sexual
offenses. A few examples illustrate this alteration within the legal landscape
of rape law. After a jury in Florida acquitted a man of committing rape, in
large part because the victim wore a provocative outfit, the Legislature
enacted a law making inadmissible "evidence presented for the purpose of
showing that [the] manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense
incited the sexual battery."55 Florida is hardly unique. For example, both
California and Pennsylvania responded to controversial judicial holdings by
enacting remedial statutes. 6
enthusiastic supporters. See, e.g.,

SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 20-29 (criticizing the Model
Penal Code approach as a flawed reform and citing other critics of its reform efforts).
46. See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 618.
47. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 29-40 (citing some of the more prominent
feminist reforms that took hold in the 1970s including reforms lobbied by a Michigan women's
rights group and the National Organization for Women).
48. See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 641.
49. See id. at 642-43.
50.

SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES

339-40 (6th ed. 1995).
51. See id. at 368; JEANNE C. MARSH, ALISON GEIST & NATHAN CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE
LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 15-18 (1982).
52. See infra notes 84, 98, 106, 112 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520b(l)(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
54. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Mass. 1982).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(3) (West 2007).
56. In reaction to Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-26 (Ct. App. 1985)
(prohibiting the prosecution of a doctor who induced a female patient to have sexual intercourse
by telling her that such act was necessary to cure a fatal disease), California enacted California
Penal Code section 266c. Act of Oct. 2, 1985, ch. 1506, 1985 Cal. Stat. 5556 (amending the
rape law by including a new category of offense where consent is procured by fraud or fear). In
reaction to Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the
evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's rape conviction even though the woman
expressly said "no"), Pennsylvania enacted title 18, section 3124.1 of the Pennsylvania
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Whether the law has gone far enough is certainly open to debate.57 But in
a few areas, courts have gone too far in eliminating appropriate protections
for criminal defendants. The most troubling area relates to the mens rea of
rape.
Imagine a case in which acquaintances engage in sexual intercourse.
After the act, the woman contends that she did not consent and the man
claims that he believed that she did. 58 To make the case even more difficult,
imagine too that the woman had at some point said "no" when the man
proposed intercourse or when he initiated physical contact. Can both
participants in the act of intercourse be right? Surely, a woman's autonomy
has been violated. Some commentators would argue unequivocally that the
described conduct should be criminal.59 Those arguments have force

Consolidated Statutes. Act of Mar. 31, 1995, No. 1995-10, § 8, 1995 Pa. Laws 10 (requiring
consent to engage in sexual intercourse). While a case like Berkowitz is troubling because the
court found that, despite the woman's express "no," the offender did not commit rape, one can
defend the decision. Lenity justified the court's interpretation of the statutory provision,
"forcible compulsion." In effect, the court held that the element of force was not met simply by
a showing of a woman's "no," and that something more than the physical contact inherent in
intercourse was needed to meet the requirement of "forcible compulsion." Berkowitz, 641 A.2d
at 1166. Further, the offender was guilty of a lesser offense, indecent assault, for which he
served jail time. Id. at 1163. Thus, the offender avoided more severe criminal sanctions not
intended to reach him, but the law did not leave the victim entirely unprotected.
57. See sources cited supra note 3.
58. These kinds of cases are the most controversial and have produced a significant body
of scholarship. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and SelfDeception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381, 382 (2005) (describing the psychological
phenomenon of "self-deception" frequently found among those accused of date rape). "Selfdeception occurs when the alleged rapist consciously, but incorrectly, believes that he has the
woman's consent when, at some less-than-fully conscious level, he knows otherwise." Id. Had
the case against National Basketball Association star Kobe Bryant gone to trial, it almost
certainly would have presented a classic case of different perceptions about whether the man
had consent. See T.R. Reid, Rape Case Against Bryant Is Dropped: Accuser Decided Against
Testifying, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at Al. For a particularly compelling personal account,
see Susan Ager, The Incident, DETROIT FREE PRESS MAG., Mar. 22, 1992, at 17.
59. See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (stating that a law requiring a
victim to "demonstrate affirmatively that sexual contact is unwanted or not permitted... would
be inconsistent with modem principles of personal autonomy"); Coughlin, supra note 44, at 2
("The contemporary critique of the law of rape proceeds from the theoretical premise that the
prohibition against rape exists to protect female sexual autonomy."); Taslitz, supra note 58, at
386-87 (indicating that where the mens rea involved is carelessness or negligence as opposed to
intentional misconduct the criminal liability should be lower). Under the Model Penal Code it is
not a crime to rape negligently. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980) (defining rape as
sexual intercourse between a man and woman where the man (a) "compels her to submit by
force," (b) impairs her judgment by drugging her, (c) engages her while she is unconscious, or
(d) engages a girl less than ten-years-old).
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because of the frequency of acquaintance rape or, at least, unwanted
intercourse.60
These kinds of cases seldom arose prior to the 1970s. At a minimum, as
long as a woman had to resist physically, one of the formal elements of
rape--either resistance or force-was missing from that scenario.6' While
resistance served different purposes, 62 it was relevant to proving mens rea
and made improbable any claim that the offender did not know that he
lacked consent.63
The kind of case that I have posited did not arise before the 1970s and
1980s because police and prosecutors did not pursue acquaintance rape
cases and cases where the woman's physical injuries were not manifest.64
As a result, most rape cases involved strangers who used violence against
their victims, where any factual disputes concerned the identity of the
offender, rather than consent, which would have been improbable in light of
the woman's injuries.65
60. In 2005, seventy-three percent of female rape or sexual assault victims stated that the
offender was an intimate, other relative, friend, or acquaintance. SHANNAN M. CATALANO, U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION,
2005,
at
9
(2006),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv05.pdf.
61. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (N.C. 1984) (holding that although the
evidence established that the act of sexual intercourse was against her will, it was insufficient to
establish the element of force to sustain conviction of second-degree rape); Berkowitz, 641 A.2d
at 1166 (holding verbal resistance inadequate to establish force element of rape); Starr v. State,
237 N.W. 96, 97 (Wis. 1931) ("We recognize the rule . . . that the woman must resist to the
utmost .... ).
62. Dressler, supra note 3, at 417 & n.41 (stating that the resistance requirement likely
served an evidentiary purpose and also "demonstrated that the victim 'merited' the law's
protection").
63. See People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that force plays
an evidentiary role and is "necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has been undertaken
against [the] victim's will"); see also Dressier, supra note 3, at 417 (stating that the resistance
requirement demonstrates "to the man (and the jury?) that the intercourse was against [the
victim's] will").
64. See Robert A. Weninger, FactorsAffecting the Prosecutionof Rape: A Case Study of
Travis County, Texas, 64 VA. L. REv. 357, 357-58 (1978) (stating that in the early 1970s, some
prosecutors dealt with the practical problems of proof by considering factors such as force or
resistance "in deciding whether to bring charges in a particular case"); William H.J. Hubbard,
Comment, Civil Settlement During Rape Prosecutions, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1231, 1256 n.133
(1999) (stating that from 1950 to 1970 some state courts "strictly required that every material
fact testified to by the complainant be corroborated by independent evidence").
65. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1213 (1997) (stating that prosecutors look to availability of
evidence and the likelihood of obtaining a conviction when deciding whether to prosecute a
rape case); Weninger, supra note 64, at 383 ("[T]he presence of substantial resistance as a
general rule increased the probability of indictment, and indictment was most likely if the
defendant was a stranger to the victim ... and least likely if an acquaintance.").
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By the 1980s, acquaintance rape cases had become more common. The
textbook case on point arose in Massachusetts.66 There, a group of doctors
pressured a nurse, a co-worker at a Boston hospital, to leave a party with
them to go to the home of one of the doctors.67 Once at the private home,
the men disrobed and eventually had intercourse with the victim over her
verbal protests.68 She did not fight because she was physically numbed by
the experience. 69 Thus, the case presented a number of cutting-edge issues.
Here, a woman had made a verbal protest, but did not otherwise resist.70
Further, although the various parties' factual accounts differed,7 even based
on the victim's account, a court might submit a mistake of fact defense to
the jury, if one were allowed.72 But the defendants may have overreached by
requesting a jury instruction that would have required the jury to "find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of [the
victim's] lack of consent, ' 73 instead of requesting an instruction that would
have allowed acquittal based on a reasonable mistake.
The defendants' request was based on a case decided by the House of
Lords in 1976. There, a divided panel found that a defendant could not be
convicted if he held an honest, even if unreasonable, belief that a woman
had consented. 74 The Lords' analysis started with a definition of rape, the
"unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent by force,
fear, or fraud., 75 It found that the minimum mens rea was "the intention to
do the prohibited act.", 76 That act was non-consensual sexual intercourse.

66. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. 1982). The case appears in several
textbooks. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 443 (3d ed.
1999); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 50, at 323-26.
67. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d at 226-27.

68. Id. at 227.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 226-27.
71. The defendants testified that the victim did not indicate her unwillingness to
accompany the men and that she consented to the acts of intercourse. Id. at 227.
72. Whether such a claim would prevail is hardly a foregone conclusion. Many jurors
might have had difficulty accepting the idea that three men would believe that a woman would
engage in group sex voluntarily. But as chronicled by Gay Talese, sexual mores were in flux
during that period of time. See generally GAY TALESE, THY NEIGHBOR'S WIFE (1980).
73. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d at 232-33.
74. Regina v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[W]hen a
defendant had had sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, genuinely believing
nevertheless that she did consent, he was not to be convicted of rape, even though the jury were
satisfied that he had no reasonable grounds for so believing . .
75. Id. at 198.
76. Id. at 191.
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Hence, the offender who believed that he was engaging in consensual
intercourse lacked the intent to commit the forbidden act.77
The Massachusetts court rejected that argument and noted that, where
American law has recognized a defense of mistake, jurisdictions have
required that the defendant "act in good faith and with reasonableness."7' 8
Because the defendants did not request a "reasonable mistake" instruction,
the court left unresolved whether Massachusetts would follow other
jurisdictions that allowed a reasonableness-mistake instruction.79
Seven years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected
the defense.8" The court did so in a case in which it might have held simply
that, were the jury to believe the victim's version of the facts, no reasonable
jury could have found that she consented." Had it limited its holding, it
would have left open whether in a proper case, a defendant could get a
reasonable-good-faith instruction. Instead, the court spoke broadly allowing
at least one lower appellate court in Massachusetts to hold that the supreme
judicial court rejected the defense even in cases in which the facts, if
believed by the jury, supported the defense.82 The court found support for its
holding in the "analogous rule that a defendant in a statutory rape case is
not entitled to an instruction that a reasonable mistake as to the victim's age
is a defense., 83 Elsewhere, most American jurisdictions that have
considered the question do allow the defense, but require that the defendant
acted honestly and reasonably. 84

77. Id. at 183.
78. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d at 233 ("We are aware of no American court of last resort that
recognizes mistake of fact, without consideration of its reasonableness as a defense ... ").
79. Id. ("We need not reach the issue whether a reasonable and honest mistake to the fact
of consent would be a defense, for even if we assume it to be so, the defendants did not request
a jury instruction based on a reasonable good faith mistake of fact.").
80. Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass. 1989) ("We have never
suggested that, 'in order to establish the crime of rape the Commonwealth must prove ... that
the defendant . . . did not act pursuant to an honest and reasonable belief that the victim
consented.'... We decline to adopt such a rule." (quoting Commonwealth v. Grant, 464 N.E.2d
33, 36 (Mass. 1984))); see also Clifton v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 155, 158 (Va. Ct. App.
1996) ("[T]he element to be proven by the Commonwealth is the fact that the intercourse was
accomplished against the victim's will. The accused's perception ... is not itself an element of
the crime.").
81. Cf People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 966 (Cal. 1992) ("[The victim's] testimony, if
believed, would preclude any reasonable belief of consent. . . . There was no substantial
evidence ... warranting an instruction as to reasonable and good faith, but mistaken, belief of
consent to intercourse.").
82. Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
83. Id.
84. E.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 208 (Cal. 2005); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713,
717 (Conn. 1989); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992).
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The importance of the legal issue in these cases cannot be overstated.
This is true especially in light of other modem developments in rape law,
85
most notably the elimination or lessening of the resistance requirement
and the reduction or elimination of the force requirement,86 found in cases
in which perceptions can differ. The offender has subjected the victim to
unwanted sexual contact, often despite her explicit protest. Catherine
MacKinnon summed up the problem from the victim's perspective: if the
male has a reasonable mistake defense, "a woman [was] raped but not by a
rapist." 87 MacKinnon is not alone in criticizing the defense.88 Women's
personal accounts often focus on their repeated protests, the man's
badgering, and their final acquiescence, often the product of feeling helpless
and numb.89
Sympathetic observers wonder how men can believe that the woman's
acquiescence is "consent" when intercourse takes place. They argue that
even if men honestly believe that "no" means "yes," the law should educate
them.9" Further, despite reforms, critics of current rape law can find
textbook examples where courts demonstrate remarkable insensitivity to
85. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520i (LexisNexis 2003) ("A victim need not
resist the actor in a prosecution [for rape]."); People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 121 (Cal. 1986)
(concluding that the legislature's purpose in amending the rape statute was to "release rape
complainants from the potentially dangerous burden of resisting an assailant").
86. See, e.g., People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he law of
rape primarily guards the integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an
act of intercourse undertaken without her consent. Because the fundamental wrong is the
violation of a woman's will and sexuality, the law of rape does not require that 'force' cause
physical harm.").
87. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635, 654 (1983).
88. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 58, at 387-88 (arguing that instead of imposing a lesser
punishment on those who rape based on a negligent mistake, the reasonable mistake defense for
rape ought to be restricted to nonnegligent mistakes for policy reasons because "male selfdeception about whether a woman has consented to sexual intercourse is plausibly widespread
and is morally worse than ordinary forms of criminal negligence").
89. See, e.g., Ager, supra note 58 ("For hours... he pestered me. Stroked me. Whispered
to me first, then argued, then whined ....All I know is that he went on forever. Unrelenting.
Finally, weary and weepy, I gave up.").
90. See Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 481 N.E.2d 227, 232 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(Brown, J., concurring) (""'No" must be understood to mean precisely that. Old cultural
patterns-no matter how entrenched-must adapt to developing concepts of equality ....
Surely [we] . . .should understand that sexist stereotypes of "no" meaning "yes" can't justify
aggression against women."' (alteration in original) (quoting Alan Dershowitz, New Rape Laws
Needed, BOSTON HERALD AM., June 24, 1985, at 19)). The problem is complicated by empirical
data suggesting that in some significant number of cases, women do mean "yes" when they say
"no." Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When
They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women 's Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988).
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victims of aggressive sexual behavior.9 At a minimum, bad cases maintain
pressure to expand the protection of rape law.
Despite MacKinnon's powerful statement, the same might be said in
other areas of the criminal law. That is, a person may experience social
harm that a particular crime is designed to prevent. Nonetheless, absent the
mens rea, the criminal law provides no redress, leaving the victim at most to
tort remedies. A few examples suffice: not all deaths caused by others are
actionable under the criminal law. Even beyond accidental deaths, absent
some kind of criminal negligence, beyond tort negligence, an actor is not
guilty of involuntary manslaughter or negligent homicide.92 Nor are all
offenders who take the property of another guilty of theft. Mistaken belief
as to ownership relieves the offender from criminal liability.93 Destroying
the property of another, with the honest belief that the actor owns the
property, is not criminal.94
Outside the rape context, the criminal law has largely settled the debate.
Mens rea is essential to the criminal law and, absent some compelling
policies to the contrary, the criminal law should require subjective fault, not
negligence, and certainly not merely the standard applicable in torts.9 5
Refusing to recognize a mistake of fact defense in cases where a reasonable
jury could make such a finding96 creates what amounts to a strict liability
offense: as long as the person engages in sexual intercourse97 and lacks
consent, he is guilty despite the lack of any culpable state of mind. Even in
jurisdictions that allow a reasonable mistake defense, the offender may be

91. People v. Heam, 300 N.W.2d 396, 397-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Thompson,
792 P.2d 1103, 1105-07 (Mont. 1990); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 774-76 (N.C. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aff'd by equally divided
court, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
92. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 140.
93. See, e.g., People v. Navarro, 160 Cal. Rptr. 692, 697-98 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1979)
(holding that a defendant who took wooden beams from a construction site in the mistaken
belief that they had been abandoned had a defense to the charge of theft).
94. See, e.g., Regina v. Smith, [1974] Q.B. 354 (reversing the conviction of a tenant who
mistakenly believed that he was the owner of floor boards that he had installed with the
landlord's permission; the criminal statute required intent to destroy property belonging to
another).
95. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 140-42
(contending that mere tort negligence is not sufficient and that there is some controversy
whether criminal negligence should even be sufficient to establish criminal liability).
96. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
97. In a jurisdiction that has abandoned spousal immunity, the underlying conduct is not
even arguably immoral, one of the earlier justifications for not requiring the defense of mistake.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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guilty of a serious felony (depending on the grading of the offense) based
on negligence, not even criminal or gross negligence.98
As mentioned above, the lack of mens rea is especially troubling if a
jurisdiction has eroded the other elements of rape.99 Thus, in some cases,
courts and legislatures have eliminated the requirement of resistance."00
Further, at least one court has found that the State has demonstrated
sufficient force merely by showing the normal force incidental to sexual
intercourse." l Various legislatures have adopted lesser offenses as well,
reducing the amount of force required,0 2 thereby increasing the risk of
criminalizing a person lacking awareness of the criminality of his conduct.
When judges "modernize" rape law, lessening the formal requirements,
they may expose an offender to a much higher penalty than would
otherwise be warranted by his conduct. Thus, imagine a statute modeled on
the common law definition of rape where a court lessens the requirement of
force and resistance in light of the current concern about women's
autonomy.0 3 An offender may well be exposed to severe sanctions,
designed for a crime of violence, for conduct that does not rise to that
statutorily required level, under circumstances where he lacks subjective
awareness of facts making his conduct criminal.

98. For example, some states only require that the defendant act negligently regarding the
victim's capacity to consent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2), 286(i), 288a
(West Supp. 2008).
99. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279-80 (N.J. 1992) (holding that the force required for
second-degree sexual assault need not be any more than the penetration itself).
102. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61, -65 (LexisNexis 2005) (classifying rape in the first
degree, requiring force, as a felony and the lesser offense of sexual misconduct, requiring only
non-consent, as a misdemeanor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(3), (5) (West 2007) (classifying
sexual battery without consent as a second degree felony, while sexual battery with force is a
felony punishable by life in prison); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.20, .35 (McKinney 2004)
(classifying rape in the first degree, requiring force, as a class B felony and the lesser offense of
sexual misconduct, requiring only non-consent, as a misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3124.1 (West 2000) (classifying sexual intercourse without consent as a second degree felony);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040, .060 (LexisNexis 2004) (classifying first degree rape
requiring forcible compulsion as a class A felony and third degree rape requiring only nonconsent as a class C felony); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (1980) (classifying the lesser
offense of "Gross Sexual Imposition," not requiring force, as a third degree felony).
103. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that even where consent is
initially given, it can be withdrawn during the act of intercourse, subjecting the male to forcible
rape charges. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003); People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 921, 924 (Ct. App. 2000).
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Although there is still debate concerning the expansion of actual
enforcement of rape and other sex offender laws,"° it is clear that rape law,
at least at the formal level, has undergone such an expansion. For example,
the law now includes many offenders who would not have been guilty of
rape at common law and who would not have been charged with any
criminal conduct thirty years ago. I have argued above that the law creates
the risk of punishing such offenders more severely than warranted by their
culpability.' °5 As developed in more detail below, that problem is further
compounded by the dramatic expansion of sexual offender laws, including
numerous "civil" disabilities imposed on sexual offenders.
Before turning to the discussion of those developments, it is important to
mention one other troubling area of traditional rape law. Unlike rape, the
elements of statutory rape have not undergone recent expansion. That is,
historically, most states have not allowed a defense of ignorance or mistake
concerning the victim's age.106
Historically, courts justified the lack of a mens rea defense on the
grounds that the man knew that the act, fornication, was immoral." 7 Insofar
as society criminalized statutory rape based on moral grounds, one might
have expected that, even if still on the books, statutory rape prosecutions
would wane.'0 8 That does not appear to be the case. One commentator has
104. See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 65, at 1210-11 (stating that most rape
victims "never see their attacker caught, tried and imprisoned," leading "advocates and scholars
to conclude that the criminal justice system discriminates against rape victims").
105. See supra notes 92-98, 103 and accompanying text.
106. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare
Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 316-17 (2003) ("[T]he idea that a crime may be
committed without proof of a criminal mens rea has continued to gain momentum since its
introduction, and stubbornly persists in statutory rape. In the majority of states . . . [the]
defendant is precluded from mounting the affirmative defense of mistake-of-age to refute the
issue of guilt." (footnotes omitted)).
107. In Regina v. Prince, the defendant was convicted of "unlawfully tak[ing] an[]
unmarried girl ... under the age of sixteen.., out of the possession and against the will of her
father." [ 1875] L.R. 2 C.C.R 154. The court denied the defense of mistake of age because "[t]he
act forbidden is wrong in itself." Id. at 174; see also People v. Griffin, 49 P. 711, 712 (Cal.
1897) ("[H]e who engages in such enterprises is committing a moral wrong, for which there can
be neither palliation nor excuse. The illegal motive is present, and that illegal motive becomes a
criminal intent when the facts, at whose peril he acts, are shown to exist."); People v. Ratz, 46
P. 915, 916 (Cal. 1896) ("The protection of society, of the family, and of the infant, demand that
one who has carnal intercourse under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the fact, and he
will not be heard against the evidence to urge his belief that the victim of his outrage had passed
the period which would make his act a crime.").
108. Alternatively, as argued by Professor Oberman, statutory rape was important earlier in
history because a virgin daughter had greater economic value to her father. Michelle Oberman,
Girls in the Master'sHouse: Of Protection,Patriarchyand the Potentialfor Using the Master's
Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 799, 802 (2001). Since few, if
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argued that the continuing interest in prosecuting statutory rape is a product
of concern about teen pregnancy." °9 Adult males account for a high number
of teen pregnancies."'0
Despite the lack of a mens rea as to age and despite the frequency with
which minors engage in sexual intercourse that is factually, if not legally,
consensual,11t some jurisdictions impose significant penalties for the
crime.'12 Further, at least in some cases, observers have often wondered
what has motivated particular prosecutions.113

The debate over the scope of sexual offender laws is not likely to end
any time soon. 4 Given the special rules governing mens rea, for example,
any, Americans make those kinds of economic calculations today, one would have thought that
statutory rape prosecutions would have waned or that states would have added a mens rea
defense.
109. Oberman, Defining a Rolefor Statutory Rape, supra note 34, at 706.
110. Id. at 705.
111. According to a 2002 study by the National Center for Health Statistics, forty-seven
percent of females and forty-six percent of males ages fifteen to nineteen reported that they had
had sexual intercourse. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES: SEXUAL ACTIVITY, CONTRACEPTIVE USE, AND

2002, A FACT SHEET FOR SERIES 23, NUMBER 24, at 1 (2004),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_O24FactSheet.pdf.
112. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80.1 (2004) (stating that consensual sexual
intercourse between a person age seventeen to nineteen and a person age fifteen to seventeen,
when the difference between the age of the victim and the age of the offender is greater than two
years, is punishable by up to six months in prison); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95, -101 (2006)
(stating that sexual penetration of a child (1) at least age fourteen but under age sixteen if the
actor is at least thirty-six months older than the child or (2) under age fourteen if the actor is at
least twenty-four months older than the child is sexual battery punishable by up to life in prison
(depending on the age of the actor)); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.51, 948.09 (West 2005) (stating
that sexual intercourse with a minor at least age sixteen is a class A misdemeanor punishable by
up to nine months in prison).
113. For example, Genarlow Wilson, an honors student, star athlete, and homecoming king,
was imprisoned for ten years for having consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl when he
was seventeen. Outrage After Teen Gets 10 Years for Oral Sex with Girl, ABC PRIMETIME, Feb,
7, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/LegalCenter/Story?id=1693362&page=l. At a wild
New Year's Eve party, where alcohol was present, a number of teenagers had intercourse and
oral sex with one another. Id. On a videotape of the party, it is clear that the defendant had
consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl at the party, but because the age of consent in
Georgia is sixteen, authorities charged Wilson with aggravated child molestation. Id. It made no
difference that there was only a two-year age difference between the defendant and the victim.
Id. The jurors felt they had no choice but to convict based on state law, but were hesitant to do
so, and so Wilson faced a mandatory sentence of ten years in prison. Id. Legislators also
questioned the prosecution, stating that the intent of the statute was to protect women and
children from sexual predators, not to police teen sex. Id.
114. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 304-05 (2006) (arguing that some sex
offender registration laws are unconstitutional); Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan's
Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 269 (2006) (discussing the overbreadth of sex offender
CHILDBEARING,
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rape law creates the possibility of convicting offenders who lack subjective
culpability.' 5 That runs counter to traditional tenets of the criminal law." 6
Even if the criminal justice system can tolerate the expansion of the law of
rape, the picture becomes more troubling when one examines the parallel
expansion of criminal and civil sanctions for sexual predators that have
spilled over to rape law as well. That is the subject of the next Part.
III.

THE CREATION OF NEW SANCTIONS FOR SEXUAL PREDATORS

A young child vanishes from her home."1 7 After frantic efforts to locate
the child, her body is found, with evidence of sexual assault."' Police
eventually arrest a convicted sex offender, who lives in her neighborhood." 9
In another episode, police find an abducted child's severed head. 2 ' In yet
another headline case, the police learn that the perpetrator, another
convicted sex offender, buried his victim alive.' 2'
Who cannot react with outrage to such stories? Despite the infrequency
of such abductions and murders,' 22 they command the public's attention,
often staying in the headlines for weeks.'23 Cases like these, although
statistical aberrations, have driven America's policies for dealing with
sexual offenders for over a decade.

registration laws); Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and
Employment Restrictions,40 AKRON L. REv. 339, 372-73 (2007) (discussing alternatives to the
current sex offender registration system).
115. See supra notes 98, 106, 112 and accompanying text.
116. See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 125-53 (citing the importance of mens rea in
determining criminal liability stating "[a]ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, or 'an act does
not make a person guilty, unless the mind be guilty' (internal parentheses omitted)).
117. This is Megan of Megan's Law. See Corrigan, supra note 114, at 267.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Singleton, supra note 20, at 604 (describing the abduction and decapitation of Adam
Walsh).
121. Id. at 606 (describing the abduction and murder of Jessica Lunsford).
122. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND
OFFENDERS:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

DATA

ON

RAPE

AND

SEXUAL

ASSAULT

27 (1997),

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf ("Since the latter half of the 1980's, the
percentage of all murders with known circumstances in which rape or other sex offenses have
been identified by investigators as the principal circumstance underlying the murder has been
declining from about 2% of murders to less than 1%.").
123. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 412-14 (1997) (discussing how the kidnapping and murder of Polly Klaas
"created overwhelming popular support for tough anti-crime legislation" eventually leading to
the enactment of California's three strikes laws).
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Legislatures around the country have enacted a variety of draconian
measures in reaction to highly publicized cases." 4 While specific
jurisdictions vary the scope of their laws, many states have increased
punishments for sexual offenses, including mandatory minimum
sentences.125 Beyond criminal punishments, states have adopted a variety of
other measures aimed at sexual offenders.
In 1994, Congress required states "to create and maintain a sexual
offender registry."' 26 Amended in 1996, the Wetterling Act includes
provisions commonly referred to as "Megan's Law."' 27 More recently,
legislatures have imposed additional registration requirements on offenders
in response to the abduction and murder of Jessica Lunsford.'2 8
Legislation varies around the country. 2 9 A review of California's various
laws provides a sense of the scope of these provisions. California law
requires almost any sexual offender to register, whether the offense is a
3
felony
misdemeanor.1
0 With a few minor exceptions, the offender must
registerorfor
the rest of that
person's life,' and the requirement applies

124. See, e.g., id.
125. California has imposed mandatory minimum sentences for a number of sex offenses.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 220, 264, 264.1, 266c, 269, 286, 288, 288.5, 288a, 289, 667.51,
667.61, 667.71 (West Supp. 2008) (imposing minimum sentences for conviction of crimes
ranging from sodomy to oral copulation to rape).
126. Mohan, supra note 20, at 706-07.
127. Id. at 707.
128. Id. at 703-04.
129. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 24 (providing a summary of sex
offender registration laws from all fifty states).
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(c) (West Supp. 2008) (listing all of the included offenses
for which a person must register as a sex offender in California).
131. Id. § 290(b). Included in this requirement are all those who have been convicted in any
California, federal, or military court of any of the included offenses since 1944, or any person
who has been released, discharged, or paroled from a penal institution where he or she was
confined for committing or attempting to commit any of the included offenses since 1944, or
determined to be a "mentally disordered sex offender" since 1944. Id. §§ 290(c), 290.004. In
addition, any person convicted since 1944 of an offense in any state, federal, or military court
must register if that offense would require registration if it had been committed in California. Id.
§ 290.005(a). Besides the included offenses, any person ordered to register as a sex offender by
any court, if the court at the time of conviction or sentencing found that the person "committed
the offense as a result of a sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification" is required
to register. Id. § 290.006. Also, if any person would be required to register in the state of
conviction for a sex offense, they must also register in California. Id. § 290.005(c). Among
those offenses committed out of state, there are a few exceptions which do not require
registration in California even if registration would be required in the state of conviction. Id. §
290.005(d). These include indecent exposure, unlawful sexual intercourse, incest, sodomy or
oral copulation among consenting adults, or pimping and pandering. Id. § 290.005(d)(l)-(5).

PUNISHING SEX OFFENDERS

40:0651]

equally whether the offender was a juvenile or adult when he'32 committed
his offense. 133 The registry includes offenders' records, photographs, and
DNA samples. 134 Failure to register is a crime: a misdemeanor if the sex
offense was a misdemeanor, a felony if the underlying offense was a
felony. 135
A look at the offenses to which registration 136 applies suggests the
breadth of the law. While legislatures have enacted registration laws in
reaction to the headline cases involving violent repeat predators, 37 they are
hardly limited to those kinds of crimes. Noted below is an exhaustive list of
the crimes to which registration applies. 138 Among those crimes listed are a

are

132. Although the requirements are gender neutral, the vast majority of registered offenders
male. HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG

CHILDREN

AS

REPORTED

TO

LAW

ENFORCEMENT:

VICTIM,

INCIDENT,

AND

OFFENDER

CHARACTERISTICS 8 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govIbjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf ("Nearly all of
the offenders in sexual assaults reported to law enforcement were male (96%).").
133. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 24, at 10-11. The subject is the source of a
great deal of criticism because there are significantly different probabilities of reoffense among
sex offenders. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE SEX OFFENDER
(2007),
7
FORCE
TASK
POLICY
http://www.nacdl.org/sl-docs.nsf/issues/sexoffender-attachments/$FILE/SexOffenderPolicy.pd
f (arguing that a "one size fits all approach to sex offenders" is illogical because although the
recidivism rate "amongst sex offenders is generally low (compared to other types of offenders)
it does vary amongst different types of sex offenders").
134. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 24, at 10.
135. Id. at 11. Failure to register has also been used as the basis for a third-strike imposing a
life sentence on the violator. See People v. Carmony, 92 P.3d 369, 371-72 (Cal. 2004). The
California Supreme Court noted that the court of appeal found that using a technical violation of
failing to register as a sex offender to sentence a man to life in prison for a third strike falls
"outside the spirit of three strikes law." Id. at 373.
136. In California, registration requires that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") collect a
signed written statement, fingerprints, and a current photograph of all offenders upon release
from incarceration. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.015(a)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2008). Among the
information collected is the name and address of the person's employer, the address of the place
of work if different from employer's address, license plate number of any vehicle registered to,
owned or regularly driven by the person, and copies of adequate proof of residence (limited to a
California driver's license or identification card, recent rent or utility receipts, printed
personalized checks, or banking documents), or a statement that the person has no reasonable
expectation of obtaining a residence in the foreseeable future. Id. § 290.015(a)(l)-(5). Any
person who changes their address must inform the local law enforcement agency where he or
she was last registered of this change within five business days of the move. Id. § 290.013(a).
137. See Singleton, supra note 20, at 623-25. See generally Mohan, supra note 20
(denoting legislative responses to the sexual offenses and murders perpetrated against children).
138. Under California law, those who must automatically register include any person who
commits murder, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999), in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of rape, sodomy, § 286, a lewd or lascivious act with a child under age fourteen, §
288, oral copulation, § 288a, or sexual penetration, § 289; kidnapping, §§ 207, 209, with the
intent to commit rape, sodomy, § 286, a lewd or lascivious act with a child under age fourteen, §
288, oral copulation, § 288a, or sexual penetration, § 289; assault with the intent to commit
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rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape or sexual penetration in concert, a lewd act with a child, or
sexual penetration, § 220; sexual battery, § 243.4; rape, either where the victim is incapable to
give legal consent because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, §
261(a)(1), where it is by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury, § 261(a)(2),
where the offender knows or should know that resistance is prevented by intoxication,
anesthesia, or a controlled substance, § 261(a)(3), where the victim was "unconscious of the
nature of the act," § 261(a)(4), or where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by
threatening to retaliate (kidnap, falsely imprison, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury,
or death) against another where there is a reasonable possibility the threat will be executed, §
261(a)(6); rape of the spouse if it is accomplished by means of force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of bodily injury and is of the level of force of violence for which the offender is sent to
state prison, § 262(a)(1); rape or sexual penetration in concert, § 264.1; luring a minor female
into prostitution, § 266; sexual intercourse, sexual penetration, oral copulation, or sodomy
induced by false or fraudulent representation when such pretense is made with intent to and
actually inducing fear which would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to free will, §
266c; pimping of a minor, § 266h(b); pandering of a minor, § 266i; intentionally providing or
offering to provide transport to a minor under age sixteen for the purpose of a lewd or lascivious
act, § 266j; abducting a minor for the purpose of prostitution, § 267; rape, rape or sexual
penetration in concert, sodomy or oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of
bodily injury, or sexual penetration with a child under age fourteen where the offender is seven
or more years older than the victim, § 269; consanguinity (incestuous marriage), § 285; sodomy,
§ 286; a lewd or lascivious act with a minor under fourteen, § 288; oral copulation with a minor
or with a non-consenting adult, § 288a; contacting a minor with the intent to commit rape,
kidnapping, a lewd or lascivious act, oral copulation, sexual penetration, rape or sexual
penetration in concert, child abuse, sodomy, oral copulation with a minor or non-consenting
adult, knowing solicitation or distribution of explicit material to a minor, forcible sexual
penetration, possession or production of child pornography with intent to distribute, knowing
employment of a minor for child pornography, or possession of child pornography, § 288.3;
continual sexual abuse of a minor, § 288.5; engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral
copulation, or sexual penetration with a child ten years or younger, if the offender is over age
eighteen, § 288.7; forcible sexual penetration, § 289; possession or production of child
pornography with intent to distribute, § 311.1; commercial and felony non-commercial child
pornography, § 311.2; production of child pornography, § 311.3; employment of minor for child
pornography, § 311.4; sale or distribution of child pornography, § 311.10; knowing possession
of child pornography, § 311.11; child molestation, § 647.6; solicitation of rape, sodomy, or oral
copulation by force or violence, § 653f(c); public or indecent exposure, § 314; luring or
inducing the delinquency of a minor for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act, §
272; or a second or subsequent conviction for distributing to a minor by phone message, email
or other method, harmful matter to arouse or seduce a minor, § 288.2. CAL. PENAL CODE §
290.003 (West Supp. 2008).
Similarly, under Arizona law, mandated registrants include any person convicted of a
violation or attempted violation of the following offenses in Arizona or if their conviction in
some other state would be a violation of Arizona law: unlawful imprisonment of a victim under
eighteen years of age if the person convicted is not the victim's parent, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1303 (2001); kidnapping of a victim under fifteen years of age, § 13-1304; sexual abuse of a
victim under fifteen years of age, § 13-1404; sexual conduct with a minor, § 13-1405; sexual
assault, § 13-1406; sexual assault of a spouse committed before August 12, 2005, § 13-1406.01
(repealed 2005); molestation of a child, § 13-1410; continuous sexual abuse of a child, § 131417; taking a child for the purpose of prostitution, § 13-3206; child prostitution, § 13-3212;
commercial sexual exploitation of a minor, § 13-3552; sexual exploitation of a minor, § 133553; luring a minor for sexual exploitation, § 13-3554; sex trafficking of a minor, § 13-1307; a
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variety of crimes where the conduct falls far short of the predatory conduct
that gave rise to the registration requirements. For example, included are
crimes like sexual battery,' 39 a variety of offenses dealing with underage
sexual partners even if the conduct is factually consensual, 4 ° and possession
of child pornography, 4' all of which present risks far different from those
giving rise to the registration laws. Further, because of the judicial
expansion of "rape," and the limited availability of the mens rea defense
when an offender claims that he believed he had consent, 42 the statute
applies with full force to offenders whose conduct may have at most been
negligent, not willful. 43 For most offenses, registration applies across the
board, without regard to unique factors relating to the offender. 44 Nor can45
an offender avoid the registration requirement through a plea bargain.'
Conviction of most sexual offenses, including oral copulation with a person
under the age of sixteen, results in automatic registration. 46 Some offenses,
including "statutory rape," do not result in automatic registration,
but may
47
court.
the
by
finding
proper
a
upon
registration
result in
Disabilities imposed on sex offenders are not limited to registration. In
some extreme examples, sex offenders may be subject to chemical
castration. 48 An offender whom a court finds to be a sexually violent
predator must comply with more frequent registration requirements than

second or subsequent violation of public sexual indecency or indecent exposure to a minor
under the age of fifteen, §§ 13-1402, 13-1403(B); a third or subsequent violation of indecent
exposure or public sexual indecency, §§ 13-1402 to -1403; and a violation of § 13-3822 or § 133824. Id. § 13-3821(A).
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West Supp. 2008).
140. Id. § 261.5; see People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 32 n.2 (Cal. 2006) (noting that the
underage female's consent was voluntary, i.e., not the product of illegal coercion).

141.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 288.3 (West Supp. 2008).

142. See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (reducing the amount of force
necessary to commit rape and adding a requirement making the definition of that force turn on
the reasonableness of the man's belief that he has consent). In such a situation, a man who is
negligent in his belief that he has consent, but who commits no act of force beyond sexual
penetration is guilty of a serious felony. Id.
143. See discussion supra Part II and notes 92-98.
144. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2008) (not providing any limitations
or specifications regarding the offender in establishing the automatic registration requirement).
145. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d at 34 ("The duty to register as a sex offender under section 290,
subdivision (a), cannot be avoided through a plea bargain .... ").
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(c). But see Hofsheier, 129 P.3d at 42 (finding the automatic
registration requirement for oral copulation with a minor unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds); People v. Dulan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 314 (Ct. App. 2007) (same).
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.006 (West Supp. 2008).
148. Id. § 645.
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other sex offenders. 149 An offender convicted of a "registerable sex
offense ' must submit to GPS monitoring for any term of parole and to
pay for it unless the Department of Corrections finds the offender unable to
pay for monitoring. 5 ' Offenders who must register may not live within
2,000 feet of a public or private school or park where children regularly
gather.5 2 Local communities may enact additional residence restrictions.'53
Finally, the Department of Justice maintains a website that provides
extensive data about each registrant and to which the public has free
54
access.1
149. See id. § 290.012(a)-(b) (stating that a person who has been adjudicated a "sexually
violent predator" must verify his or her registration every ninety days as opposed to being
required to register annually).
150. A "registerable sex offense" is one that requires registration under California Penal
Code section 290(c). Id. § 3000.07.
151. Id. § 3000.07(a)-(b).
152. Id. § 3003.5(b).
153. Id. § 3003.5(c).

154. Id. § 290.4;

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

supra note 24.

By July 1, 2005, the DOJ was required to make available via the internet the name, known
aliases, a photograph, a physical description, gender, race, date of birth, criminal history, prior
adjudication as a sexually violent predator, address at which the person resides, and any other
information the DOJ deems relevant for those convicted of kidnapping, with the intent to
commit rape, sodomy, a lewd or lascivious act with a minor, oral copulation, or sexual
penetration, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 209 (West 1999); rape by threat or force, § 261; rape or
sexual penetration in concert, § 264.1; rape, sodomy, sexual penetration, or oral copulation of a
minor under fourteen years of age, § 269; sodomy with a person under age fourteen where the
offender is more than ten years older or sodomy in concert, § 286(c)-(d); felony lewd or
lascivious conduct with a minor under age fourteen or by force or where the offender is more
than ten years older than the victim under the age of fourteen, § 288(a)-(c); oral copulation with
a minor under age fourteen or in concert, § 288a(c)-(d); felony communication with a minor to
commit a number of crimes including kidnapping, child pornography, oral copulation, and
sodomy, § 288.3; continual sexual abuse of a minor under age fourteen, § 288.5; sexual
penetration by force or on a child under the age of fourteen where the offender is more than ten
years the victim's senior, §§ 288(a)-(c), 289(a); sodomy, sexual intercourse, oral copulation, or
sexual penetration with a minor ten-years-old or younger, § 288.7; or any person adjudicated a
sexually violent predator, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2006). CAL. PENAL CODE §
290.46(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2008).
Another class of offenders exists: those who commit assault with the intent to commit rape,
sodomy, oral copulation, rape or sexual penetration in concert, a lewd act with a child, or sexual
penetration, CAL. PENAL CODE § 220 (West 1999); rape, either where the victim is incapable of
giving consent because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, §
261(a)(1), where it is by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury, § 261(a)(2), or
where the victim was "unconscious of the nature of the act," § 261(a)(4); sodomy where the
offender is over twenty-one and the victim under sixteen, where the victim is unconscious of the
nature of the act, where the victim cannot give legal consent due to mental disorder or
developmental or physical disability, or where the victim is prevented from resisting because of
intoxication or some controlled substance, § 286(b)(2), (f), (g), (i); oral copulation where the
offender is over twenty-one and the victim under sixteen, where the victim is unconscious of the
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nature of the act, where the victim cannot give legal consent due to mental disorder or
developmental or physical disability, or where the victim is prevented from resisting because of
intoxication or some controlled substance, § 288a(b)(2), (f), (g), (i); or sexual penetration where
the offender is over twenty-one and the victim under sixteen, where the victim is unconscious of
the nature of the act, where the victim cannot give legal consent due to mental disorder or
developmental or physical disability, or where the victim is prevented from resisting because of
intoxication or some controlled substance, § 289(b), (d), (e), (i). For these offenders, the internet
website makes available the offender's name, known aliases, photograph, physical description,
gender, race, date of birth, criminal history, community of residence, and ZIP code, along with
any other information the DOJ deems relevant. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.46(c)(1)-(2) (West
Supp. 2008).
The same information is provided for those convicted of felony sexual battery, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 243.4(a) (1999); felony enticement of a minor into prostitution, § 266; felony
inducement of sexual intercourse, sexual penetration, oral copulation, or sodomy by fraudulent
misrepresentation, § 266c; transporting or providing a child under sixteen for the purpose of
causing, inducing, or persuading a child to engage in a lewd or lascivious act, § 266j;
kidnapping for the purpose of prostitution, § 267; misdemeanor lewd or lascivious act with a
child under fourteen when the offender is at least ten years older, § 288(c); misdemeanor
meeting or communicating with a minor with intent to commit a covered offense, § 288.3; a
registered sex offender who enters a school building without permission, § 626.81; child
molestation, § 647.6; a registered sex offender whose crime was against an elder or dependent
adult who then enters, without permission, into the grounds of a day care residential facility
where elders or dependent adults are present, § 653c; and any person required to register as a
result of an out-of-state conviction unless that crime would be punishable in California, in
which case the notification requirement for that crime shall apply. CAL. PENAL CODE §
290.46(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2008).
A person convicted of felony sexual battery or misdemeanor child molestation may apply to
the DOJ for exclusion from the website if that is their only conviction. Id. § 290.46(e)(1).
Exclusion from the website does not remove the duty to register. Id. A person may apply to be
relieved of the duty to register if he or she is able to obtain a certificate of rehabilitation and the
offense or attempted offense for which he or she was convicted is not: kidnapping, with the
intent to commit rape, sodomy, a lewd or lascivious act with a minor, oral copulation, or sexual
penetration, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 207, 209 (West 1999); assault with the intent to commit rape,
sodomy, oral copulation, rape or sexual penetration in concert, a lewd act with a child, or sexual
penetration, § 220; sexual battery, § 243.4; rape, either where the victim is incapable to give
consent because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, § 261 (a)(1), where
it is by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury, § 261(a)(2), where the offender
knows or should know that resistance is prevented by intoxication, anesthesia, or a controlled
substance, § 261(a)(3), where the victim was "unconscious of the nature of the act," § 261(a)(4);
rape or sexual penetration in concert, § 264.1; luring a minor female into prostitution, § 266;
sexual intercourse, sexual penetration, oral copulation, or sodomy induced by false or fraudulent
representation when such pretense is made with the intent to induce and actually results in
inducing fear which would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to free will, § 266c;
kidnapping a minor for the purpose of prostitution, § 267; rape, rape or sexual penetration in
concert, sodomy or oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury,
or sexual penetration with a child under age fourteen where the offender is seven or more years
older than the victim, § 269; sodomy, § 286; a lewd or lascivious act with a minor under
fourteen, § 288; oral copulation with a minor or with a non-consenting adult, § 288a; continual
sexual abuse of a minor, § 288.5; forcible sexual penetration, § 289; or child molestation, §
647.6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West Supp. 2008). Also, any person who is required to
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A few litigants have successfully challenged specific application of these
provisions on constitutional grounds. For example, one California court
held that the retroactive application of the rules governing residency would
amount to an ex post facto clause violation.' 55 In another case, the California
Supreme Court found that the legislation requiring registration for a person
guilty of having oral copulation with an underage female denied the
offender equal protection because, had he committed sexual intercourse, he
would have been subject to registration only upon a specific finding by the
trial court. 5 6 Those courts have not suggested, however, that the overall
scheme of heightened punishment for sex offenders violates the
Constitution.157
No one doubts the impetus for these heightened sanctions. However, it is
important to question whether they are warranted. As discussed below,
many commentators have grave doubts about the efficacy, fairness, and
wisdom of many of these provisions.
IV.

LACK OF COHERENCE AND UNWARRANTED PUNISHMENT: ONE SIZE

DOES NOT FIT THE CRIME OR THE CRIMINAL
As developed in the previous Part, many jurisdictions impose substantial
disabilities on sexual offenders, beyond those reserved for other criminal
offenders.' 58 This state of affairs begs the question whether such special
treatment is warranted. To make the point, this Part asks why our society
imposes punishment generally and why it is punishing and otherwise
disabling sexual offenders beyond normal sanctions. Further, it argues that
the unequal treatment for many sexual offenders is unjustified.
More specifically, this Part examines whether long prison sentences for
sexual offenders are warranted in light of the need to incapacitate
particularly dangerous offenders, likely to commit additional crimes upon
their release. 5 9 Further, it discusses whether longer sentences are justified
register under section 290 and who enters the sex offender website is subject to fine or
imprisonment. Id. § 290.46(k).
155. See Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181-83 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that the residency requirement would be an unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto clause
if applied retroactively).
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 2008); People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 32
(Cal. 2006); see also People v. Hofsheier, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2004).
157. In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311, 332, 334 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the sex offender

registration requirement is not punishment and thus cannot be held unconstitutional for ex post
facto reasons).
158. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes.
159. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
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based on offenders' culpability. 6 ' The Part concludes by raising doubts
about the wisdom of many of the recent punishments and disabilities
applied across the board to sexual offenders. 161
The United States experienced a long and deep decline in crime rates for
most of the 1990s.1 62 Measuring the extent to which incapacitation explains
the decline in crime is difficult at best. 6 3 While some have argued that the
decline in the crime rates during the end of the twentieth century was a
product of high incarceration rates,' 64 both the extent to which it prevents
crime 165 and the availability of alternatives to achieve the same results 66 are
open topics of debate. 67 Whether incapacitation works with regard to sexual
offenders specially is at least as difficult to resolve.
No doubt, the "poster" offenders whose predatory conduct has led to
enactment of the protective legislation are real and exceedingly

160. See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
162. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE, at v-vi (2007)
(stating that "[t]he rate of reported crimes ... dropped each year after 1991 for nine years in a
row" and discussing the "character, the causes, and the consequences of the crime decline").
163. See id. at 48-55 (discussing the role of incarceration in preventing crime and
acknowledging the "difficulty ... in estimating the extent to which variations in incarceration
rates will cause changes in crime rates"); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 42, 46 (1995) (discussing
the "complicated process" and "difficulty" of estimating the crime prevention benefits of
incapacitative imprisonment); Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal
Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 536, 555-56 (2006) ("[M]ore work is needed to fully
understand the links between recidivism, incapacitation, and crime prevention.").
164. See ZIMRING, supra note 162, at 49 ("Since a huge increase in incarceration was the
major policy change in American criminal justice in the last three decades of the twentieth
century, one would expect many observers to give this boom in imprisonment the lion's share of
the credit for declining crime in the United States."); Leipold, supra note 163, at 541 (stating
that "incapacitation works" as a method of preventing future crime); Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six
that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178-79 (2004) ("[T]he increase in incarceration over the
1990s can account for the reduction in crime of approximately 12 percent for [violent crimes]
and 8 percent for property crimes, or about one-third of the observed decline in crime.").
165. See ZIMRING, supra note 162, at 52 (discussing the "rather modest role" that
incapacitation played in the crime decline of the 1990s).
166. For example, as argued by Professor Franklin Zimring, Canada experienced similar
declines in crime rates to the United States during the 1990s. Id. at 129. It did so without a
similar increase in incarceration. Id. at 107-2 1.
167. See id. at v (stating that "the great American crime decline" of the 1990s is "a mystery
to this day" and that there "is little consensus among experts about what changes in
circumstances produced the crime decline or what is likely to happen next"); ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 163, at 166-67 (discussing contemporary policy debates concerning the
success of crime prevention by means of incapacitation).
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dangerous.'68 As critics have observed, though, legislatures have created
broad statutory protections based on an incorrect view of sexual offenders
as a homogenous group. In An American Travesty: Legal Responses to
Adolescent Sexual Offenders, Professor Franklin Zimring observed,
[P]olicy toward sex offenders is often based on monolithic images
of alien pathologies; it is rarely based on facts. The extraordinary
heterogeneity of sex offenders and sex offenses is almost never
appreciated in the legislative process. Policies are crafted in fearful
haste, often as symbolic gestures to honor the crime victims whose
suffering has inspired them. The factual foundations for major
shifts in policy are
often slender; once laws are passed they are
169
rarely evaluated.

Policies driven by the view of sexual offenders as "a breed apart"'7 have
produced bad results.
Zimring makes a compelling case of bad public policy by focusing on
the specific problem of juvenile sexual offenders. 7 ' An American Travesty
demonstrates the incredible breadth of some statutes aimed at sexual
offenders, for example, those dealing with crimes against juveniles.'72 By
lumping juvenile offenders with adult offenders, legislatures ignore
developmental aspects of juveniles' unlawful conduct. As a result, such

168. See Barry M. Maletzky & Gary Field, The Biological Treatment of Dangerous Sexual
Offenders, a Review and Preliminary Report of the Oregon Pilot depo-Provera Program, 8
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 391, 392 (2003) (stating that there is a "select group" of sexual

offenders that "can be characterized by a predatory pattern; the creation of multiple victims; the
commission of more aggressive crimes; often, the presence of attraction to boys; and frequently,
the existence of central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction or psychiatric disabilities resulting in
deficient impulse control").
169.

FRANKLIN

E.

SEXUAL OFFENDING,

ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT

at xiii (2004).

170. Id. at xv.
171. See id. at 3.

172. Under New Jersey's Megan's laws in the mid-1990s, juvenile sex offenders were
classified by the same criteria as adults. Id. at 6. In one case, a ten-year-old boy charged with
second degree sexual assault of his eight-year-old cousin was classified as a moderate-risk sex
offender requiring formal notification to all schools within a two-mile radius. Id. at 3-5. His
high classification was due in part to the fact that the victim was under thirteen. Id. at 6. New
Jersey law essentially judged the conduct of a ten-year-old boy with an eight-year-old girl by
the same standards as it would a twenty-eight-year-old man with an eight-year-old girl. Id.
In a similarly broad statute, a 1998 Idaho law required registration of adults and youths for
the exact same offenses. Id. at 13. Under one such offense ("[l]ewd conduct with [m]inor [c]hild
under [s]ixteen") two consenting fifteen-year-olds engaged in "heavy petting" would both be
guilty of a felony "that requires them to register as sex offenders until at least age twenty-one."
Id.
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legislation fails to assess the risk of juveniles reoffending"' Zimring's
review of the data suggests that juvenile offenders are less likely to commit
repeated sexual offenses than they are other types of offenses.7 4 That is, the
unselective use of stepped-up sentences for juvenile sex offenders are hard
to justify if the rationale is incapacitation.
Even adult sexual offenders are not the homogenous group assumed by
legislatures.' Many sex offenders do not suffer from sexual pathologies. 76
Further, although measuring recidivism for sexual offenses is imperfect,
"sex offenders are relatively unlikely to commit future sexual offenses, and
actually pose a greater risk of committing future non-sexual offenses."' 7 7
Recidivism among sexual offenders is low and researchers cannot
determine the exact extent to which an offender is likely to commit another

173. See id. at 87 (discussing the influential National Task Force on Juvenile Sexual
Offending and its "failure to address the developmental aspects of juvenile offending,... or the
contrast or similarities between juvenile and adult sex offending" leaving it "without a clear
rationale guiding its specialized focus"). Zimring also states that a lot of public policy is "based
on assumptions of continuity between youthful and adult sex offenders" and that "there is a
troubling shortage of data and research" exploring the similarities and differences between the
two. Id. at 63.
174. Id. at 58-62 (discussing the results of several studies showing that "[t]he re-arrest rate
for all offenses can be quite high in this period of adolescent development ...but the rate of rearrest for sex offenses is small").
175. See id. at 28 (stating that "recent legislation and policymaking" is partly based on the
assumption that sex offenders specialize in sex offenses, but that "[m]ost repeat criminals are
generalists whose criminal histories comprise a variety of different types of offense[s]"); Eric S.
Janus, Legislative Responses to Sexual Violence: An Overview, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
247, 252 (2003) ("[I]t is clear that sexual violence is a 'complex amalgam of factors' that only
sometimes includes deviant sexuality, and often includes antisocial behaviors and distorted
attitudes about women and sexuality. The proper understanding and classification of sexual
violence is an ongoing project that ought to be informed by both science and social policy.");
Robert A. Prentky et al., Introduction, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. ix, at xi (2003) ("With
respect to diversity, we have moved well beyond our earlier focus on impulsive, antisocial
criminals serving time in prison for felony sexual assaults on strangers. Sexual coercion and
sexual aggression is expressed or manifest in a remarkably wide range of behaviors ....
").
176. See ZIMRING, supra note 169, at 29 ("When serious sex offenders are compared with
those who commit theft or violent crimes, the prevalence of a distinct pathology is greater
among sex offenders, but there is nevertheless substantial heterogeneity in almost every
category of severe sex crime."); John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming:
Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 559, 569-70 (2006).
177. Stinneford, supra note 176, at 570. According to a meta-analysis of eighty-two
recidivism studies, "[m]ost sexual offenders were not caught for another sexual offense
(13.7%); on average, they were more likely to recidivate with a nonsexual offense than a sexual
offense (overall recidivism rate of 36.2%)." R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The
Characteristicsof PersistentSexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1154, 1158 (2005).
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sexual offense.17 8 However, two factors have been found to increase the
likelihood of sexual recidivism: paraphilia and an antisocial orientation. 79
The policy implications of these data are significant. An increasing
amount of literature recognizes that criminal justice experts can make
accurate risk assessments. That is, sentencing authorities can predict with
increasing accuracy whether a particular offender will commit additional
crimes. 8 ' Further, an increasing body of research should allow more
targeted use of limited prison resources.1 8 As concluded by two social
scientists, "the intensity of services and supervision should be matched to
the level of offender risk .... Failing to match risk with intensity of services
can diminish public safety, waste correctional resources, 1and
increase the
' 82
probability of criminal behavior among low-risk offenders."
Worth underscoring is a concern raised in the social science literature
that choosing the wrong intervention for some low risk offenders increases
the likelihood that they will commit additional crimes.183 The proposition is
178. Stinneford, supra note 176, at 571.
179. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 177, at 1158 ("Sexual deviancy and antisocial
orientation were the major predictors of sexual recidivism for both adult and adolescent sexual
offenders."); Stinneford, supra note 176, at 571.
180. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 34 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) ("[A]ctuarial
measures of predicting the risk of recidivism posed by individual offenders have become more
powerful over time."); ZIMRING, supra note 162, at 162 ("The data collection required for this
type of analysis is not complicated."); Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 177, at 1158-59
(discussing the "predictors" of sexual recidivism); Edward J. Latessa & Christopher
Lowenkamp, What Works in Reducing Recidivism?, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521, 532-33 (2006)
(discussing "[flour major factors . . . significantly related to recidivism"); Christopher T.
Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Increasing the Effectiveness of CorrectionalProgramming
Through the Risk Principle:Identifying Offenders for Residential Placement,4 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL'Y 263, 270-71 (2005) (finding that an offender's "risk score demonstrate[s] fair
predictive validity" of reincarceration and that "recidivism rates increase substantially with each
category of risk"); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REv. 391, 406, 408 (2006) ("Recent
research . . .indicates that the predictive validity of actuarial [or statistical] instruments has
significantly improved in the past twenty years .... In the past several years . . . a number of
violence risk assessment tools have become available ....
");Prentky et aL, supra note 175, at
xi ("[T]here has been a dramatic increase in the development, validation, and revision of risk
assessment procedures during the past decade."); Stinneford, supra note 176, at 570-72
(discussing the factors associated with increased risk of reoffending based on the findings of
studies involving nearly 60,000 sex offenders).
181. See Lowenkamp & Latessa, supra note 180, at 264 (discussing "[m]any meta-analytic
reviews that have investigated the link between risk level and program effectiveness" and
stating that information and data regarding offender risk can "lead to a more effective and
efficient use of community corrections' resources").
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., id. at 283-84 (finding "substantial" increases in recidivism rates for low and
moderate risk offenders admitted into residential treatment programs and discussing the
"importance of studying the different effects of programs [on] distinct groups of offenders").
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not counterintuitive. Low-risk offenders have more support available for
"pro-social" activity than do high-risk offenders.' 84 Placing low-risk
offenders in facilities with high-risk offenders "provides an environment in
which individuals who are lower risk learn antisocial behavior that is
'
modeled for them, and form new peer associates."185
Instead of a policy that focuses on individual offenders, states have based
sexual offender laws on the stereotype of the sex offender as a "breed
apart." That leads to unnecessary incarceration for many sexual offenders
who represent a low risk of reoffending. Further, incarceration may even, in
fact, increase the risk of their reoffending.
The poor policy choices are especially evident when one examines the
expansion of sexual offenders that took place over the past twenty-five
years. As discussed above, courts and legislatures have reduced the
resistance requirement, increasing the number of cases in which an actor
may not know that he lacks consent to engage in intercourse.'86 Further,
jurisdictions have rejected a good faith defense and, at most, have allowed a
reasonable mistake of fact defense.'87 The result is that at least some
offenders may have been negligent, but lacked the level of culpability
ordinarily required by the criminal law, especially for offenders convicted
of serious felonies.'88 Other offenders may have been mistaken about
consent, but a jury might have found the mistake reasonable. Even though
this possibility exists, some jurisdictions disallow a defense even in those
circumstances. 189
While data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not
allow close scrutiny of the particular kinds of sexual offenses other than
forcible rape, 9 ° the data shows that jurisdictions are incarcerating increasing
numbers of sexual offenders who have not committed forcible rape. 9'
184. Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Edward J. Latessa & Alexander M. Holsinger, The Risk
Principle in Action: What Have We Learned from 13,676 Offenders and 97 Correctional
Programs?, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 77, 89 (2006) (stating that "prosocial networks" such as
"school, friendships, employment, family, and so on" are the "very attributes" that make some
offenders low risk).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 50, 85-86, 103 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

188. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
190. See ZIMRING, supra note 169, at 21, 24 (stating that "[i]nformation on the number of
reports by citizens is available for only one offense-forcible rape" and that "[a]rrest volume is a
meaningful indicator of the volume of only one of the serious sex crimes-forcible rape").
Zimring further states that "official statistics are not a good indicator of the prevalence or
incidence" of other offenses. Id. at 21.
191. Id. at 35 (stating that data from 1980 to 1997 show that "[t]he growth rate of persons
incarcerated for the 'other sexual assault' category was four times as large as for rape, and 80
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Professor Zimring has focused on the special problems when the offenders
are juveniles.'92 This group is likely to include some significant number of
offenders who do not fit the stereotype of a sexual deviant or forcible rapist.
The most extreme examples are those guilty of statutory rape, where
mistake of fact as to the victim's age is seldom a defense in American
jurisdictions.193 Despite the fact that the perceived conduct (sexual
intercourse between consenting adults) now has constitutional protection,19 4

and, at worst, is immoral but legal, an offender may come within the
increasingly severe punishment reserved for sexual predators.' 95 Absent a
mens rea requirement, one would assume that a portion of offenders are low
risk offenders whose punishment is unwarranted if society's goal is the
reduction in crime through incapacitation while they are in prison.
The problem with the current approach to sexual offenders is
compounded when one considers additional disabilities that flow from the
status as a sexual offender. Many statutes create reporting and residency
requirements in addition to GPS monitoring.'96 These requirements oblige
both the criminal justice system and individual offenders to bear additional
costs. 197 Recent news stories underscore one of the costs to the offenders.
percent of the 71,200 additional sex prisoners added to U.S. prisons ...were in the 'other
sexual assault' category").
192. Id. at vii (stating that his focus is on the small area of penal policy "concerned with the
societal response to the juvenile sex offender").
193. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
194. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
195. ZIMRING, supra note 169, at 19, 33 (stating that while the criminal prohibitions may
not have increased, "the impact of [Lawrence v. Texas] on adultery and fornication prohibitions
is unclear" and "the legal apparatus for discovering, punishing, and controlling sex offenders
[has] expanded substantially").
196. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (Supp. 2007) (providing the registration
requirements for sex offenders); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West Supp. 2008) (stating that
high risk sex offenders "shall not be placed or reside, for the duration of his or her parole,
within one-half mile of any public or private school including any or all of kindergarten and
grades 1 to 12, inclusive"); Id. § 3003.5(b) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is
unlawful for any person for whom registration is required pursuant to Section 290 to reside
within 2000 feet of any public or private school, or park where children regularly gather.").
197. See, e.g., MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE IMPACT OF
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:

A

LITERATURE REVIEW 38, 41 (2006), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06008.pdf (stating that it would cost California approximately $88.4 million per year to monitor
and supervise high-risk sex offenders); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification: Emerging Legal and Research Issues, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
337, 345 (2003) ("As jurisdictions have painfully become aware, registration and notification,
whatever their benefits, are far from cost-free .... [I]t is clear that there is no escaping the basic
fiscal and resource impacts associated with implementing and maintaining the laws ....
");Dan
Gunderson, Corrections Officials Critical of Expanded Sex Offender Monitoring (Minn. Public
Radio broadcast
Feb. 22,
2006), available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/
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For example, the media recently reported the case of three offenders forced
to live under a highway bridge because they could not find housing that
complied with various legal requirements.' 98
The registration requirement poses the risk of additional penalties for the
offender.' 99 His failure to register, even under circumstances where the
police know of his location and where he may have recently registered, but
is now required to reregister, is criminal, exposing the offender to additional
criminal sanctions. 00 That is the case despite the view of some courts that
the failure to reregister is one of the most passive of all felonies.2"'
Commentators have suggested some of the problems with these
requirements, including the risk that, in order to find housing not within
proximity to schools or parks, offenders will be driven into rural
communities with fewer law enforcement resources than their big city
counterparts.20 2 Further, broadly written statutes that lump a wide range of
display/web/2006/02/16/gpstracking/ (stating that Minnesota Department of Corrections
officials estimate that monitoring sex offenders "costs $20 per day for each offender"). The cost
of civil commitment also significantly burdens the criminal justice system. See Monica Davey
& Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4,
2007,
at
Al1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/
us/04civil.html?pagewanted=all ("The cost of the programs is virtually unchecked and growing,
with states spending nearly $450 million on them this year. The annual price of housing a
committed sex offender averages more than $100,000, compared with about $26,000 a year for
keeping someone in prison .... ).
198. Isaiah Thompson, Swept Under the Bridge, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007,
Residency
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2007-03-08/news/swept-under-the-bridge/full.
restrictions often prohibit sex offenders from living within certain distances of schools or
childcare facilities. NEITO & JUNG, supra note 197, at 3. Some of the more restrictive statutes do
not allow sex offenders within 2,500 feet of any place where children congregate. Id.; see also
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing various statutory
requirements imposed on sex offenders); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 197 ("Few states
have figured out what to do when they do have graduates ready for supervised release. In
California, the state made 269 attempts to find a home for one released pedophile. In
Milwaukee, the authorities started searching in 2003 for a neighborhood for a 77-year-old
offender, but have yet to find one.").
199. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (delineating the requirements
imposed upon sex offenders post-conviction); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 2008).
200. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.012(a) (West Supp. 2008) (requiring reregistration
within five days of offender's first birthday following registration); see also People v. Carmony,
26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 381 (Ct. App. 2005) (overturning a twenty-five year sentence for failure to
reregister under California's sex offender registration laws where the state had already been
informed of the defendant's current address).
201. See, e.g., Carmony, Cal. Rptr. 3d at 372 (finding the offense of failing to reregister "an
entirely passive, harmless, and technical violation of the registration law").
202. See NEITO & JUNG, supra note 197, at 23-25 (discussing the unintended consequences
of sex offender residency restrictions); Logan, supra note 197, at 343-45 (discussing the
negative consequences of notification laws, including "ostracization [and] residential exclusion"
and that "poor areas ... often accommodate a disproportionate number of registrants"); Laurie
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offenders 20 representing
vastly divergent risks waste these additional
3
resources.

Much of the previous discussion also suggests why many sentences
imposed on sexual offenders are unfair. The courts afford criminal
defendants meager constitutional protection. The Supreme Court provides
extremely limited protection to those who challenge their sentences as
disproportionate. 24 Equal protection claims seldom prevail." 5 Further, the
Supreme Court has upheld a variety of disabilities imposed on sex offenders
as "civil," despite the additional burden imposed on those
offenders.20 6
20 7
equality.
and
Nonetheless, our system values proportionality
Beyond a few deceptively easy examples, 28 defining proportional
sentences is difficult at best.2 9 Insofar as proportionality is a limiting
0. Robinson, Sex Offender Management: The Public Policy Challenges, 989

ANNALS N.Y.
AcAD. SCI. 1, 6 (2003) (stating that some community notification requirements have forced sex
offenders to go "underground"); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 197 (noting some of the
difficulties in finding homes for released sex offenders).
203. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes.
204. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (holding that a sentence of
twenty-five years to life for the current offense of theft of three golf clubs is not grossly
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994,
1001 (1991) (upholding a mandatory sentence of life without parole for possession of more than
650 grams of cocaine imposed on an offender with no prior felony convictions and holding that
the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee).
205. See NEITO & JUNG, supra note 197, at 44 ("[A]ccording to the courts that have visited
the issue so far, residency restrictions do not offend the equal protection clause. They represent
a rational legislative determination that excluding sex offenders from areas where children
congregate will advance the state's interest in protecting children.").
206. The Supreme Court has held that civil commitment laws are "nonpunitive." See
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997). In doing so, the Court rejected the notion that
civil commitment amounted to double jeopardy or an ex post facto law. See Kansas v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002) (upholding civil commitment statute so long as the offender has
difficulty controlling dangerous behavior); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (upholding the
constitutionality of a Kansas civil commitment statute and stating that confinement of "the
dangerously mentally ill" is a "nonpunitive governmental objective").
207. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("The constitutional principle of
proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century."); MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING

27 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) ("The goal of proportionality in

punishment is ubiquitous in legislative statements of the underlying purposes of criminal
sentencing."); DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 11, 53-69 (discussing proportionality and punishment
and stating that criminal law "ought to be fair" and "deal coherently with person charged with
crime").
208. For example, "a life for a life." The Biblical context of the phrase appears in
Deuteronomy chapter 19: "[I]f a man hates his neighbor and lies in wait for him, assaults and
kills him, and then flees.., the elders of his town shall send for him, bring him back from the
city, and hand him over to the avenger of blood to die." Deuteronomy 19:11-12. The chapter
ends with the passage, "And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth
for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." Deuteronomy 19:21.
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principle, punishment is excessive if it serves none of the other purposes of

punishment.2"' As argued above, long prison sentences for all sexual
offenders simply cannot be justified based on a need to protect the public
from repeat offenders." Absent some evidence that such sentences deter

others," incarcerating many sexual offenders is unjustified.
The problem is especially acute for offenders who commit statutory rape
and lack any mens rea defense as to the victim's age. While commentators
have argued that such strict liability is unconstitutional,2" 3 the argument is
more theoretical than real given the absence of case law supporting that
conclusion.21 4 Nonetheless, the argument is powerful: punishing an offender
whose mens rea is at most negligent if the jurisdiction allows a reasonable
mistake of fact defense, 1 5 or who is guilty of a felony without evidence of
any culpability is unjustified.21 6
209. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 28 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) ("[I]t is
unclear what result is intended when proportionality in punishment conflicts with another
statutory goal of sentencing, such as the rehabilitation or incapacitation of [the] offender.");
DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 53, 58-60 (comparing the utilitarian and retributivist view of
proportionality). Proportionality is often included in sentencing codes as a "limit on sentence
severity in pursuit of utilitarian objectives," but some statutes have no language that can be
construed as a "proportionality ceiling on punishment severity." MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING 29 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
210. H.L.A.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

237 (1968) (describing a brand of

retributive theory that treats retribution as setting an outer limit for punishment, but determines
actual punishment by reference to what is needed to prevent repetition of the crime).
211. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
212. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 34 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) ("The
feasibility of general deterrence through marginal increases in the severity of criminal
punishments is in doubt ....
); ZIMRING, supra note 162, at 53-54 (stating that the possibility
that incapacitation deters criminal conduct is "untestable"); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note
163, at 157-58 (discussing the capability of incapacitation to "control rather than influence"
criminal behavior and stating that "crime prevention that requires physical control of its subjects
lasts no longer than the doors and gates remain locked").
213. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 114, at 299 ("[B]ecause of the convergence of several
factors, the sweeping nature of sex offender registration laws creates an impermissibly punitive
and unconstitutional impact on the strict liability offender.").
214. The Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas held that there is no "constitutional doctrine of
mens rea." 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968). Today, the majority of states continue to endorse the
use of strict liability for statutory rape. Carpenter, supra note 114, at 320. As of 2006, twentynine states and the District of Columbia treat statutory rape as a strict liability offense. Id. at
317.
215. E.g., People v. Hemandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964) ("We hold only that in the
absence of a legislative direction otherwise, a charge of statutory rape is defensible wherein a
criminal intent is lacking.").
216. In a prosecution for statutory rape under a strict liability framework, the state is not
required to prove mens rea. "[C]onsequently, the defendant may not offer an affirmative mens
rea defense of mistake-of-age." Carpenter, supra note 114, at 317; see, e.g., Owens v. State, 724
A.2d 43, 45 (Md. 1999) (holding that due process did not entitle defendant to mistake-of-age
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Punishments for sexual offenders are troubling from an equality
perspective as well. The various sexual offender statutes have piled assorted
punishments and disabilities on sexual offenders." 7 These disabilities are
not justified based on some special risk of reoffending.218 Many sexual
offenders are less likely to commit additional sexual offenses than other
offenders are likely to commit new crimes.2 9 Thus, for many states the
difference in treatment for differing categories of offenders is significant.
States reserve stepped-up punishments and disabilities for sexual offenders,
including lifetime registration requirements.22 ° By comparison, states do not
provide similar disabilities for other offenders. 22' For example, legislatures
do not single out for stepped-up punishments offenders who commit violent
crimes and who represent a significant risk of reoffending.222 Under the
current sentencing scheme in many jurisdictions, a sexual offender who has
not committed a crime of violence and who may have had a reasonable
mistake as to his sex partner's age may receive a long prison sentence and
be required to register as a sex offender for life.223 A far more dangerous
offender does not face the same disabilities.
defense); State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 50, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 50, 680 N.W.2d 810, 50.
("[W]e conclude it is not violative of due process for the state legislature to forbid a defense of
fraud or reasonable mistake about the age of the victim."). Without a culpability requirement, a
conviction for strict liability statutory rape makes no distinctions between "a sexual predator
who has demonstrated a predilection for underage partners, or ... a nineteen-year-old who is
simply operating under a reasonable mistake of fact." Carpenter, supra note 114, at 318.
217. See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes.
218. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
219. NAT'L ASs'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 133, at 7 (noting that the
likelihood of reoffense among sex offenders is lower than other categories of criminal
offenders).
220. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (Supp. 2007) (providing registration
requirements for sex offenders and provisions for offender monitoring); CAL. PENAL CODE §
290 (West Supp. 2008).
221. The exception is three strikes statutes, which impose heightened punishment for
certain recidivists. As I have argued elsewhere, those statutes share similarities with sex
offender statutes-they are often the product of the passions of the moment, see Michael
Vitiello, California's Three Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial Activism California'sBest
Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1025, 1071 (2004), and lead to disproportionate and unequal
sentences for many offenders, see Vitiello, supra note 123, at 425-27.
222. See ZIMRING, supra note 169, at 43 (stating that juveniles have a high rate of total
burglary arrests, yet, unlike sex offenses, there is no "special liability" for burglaries).
223. Under California law, a person who commits sodomy with a person under the age of
eighteen is subject to lifetime registration, even if the offender makes a reasonable mistake as to
the victim's age and the offense is committed without violence. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
286(a)-(b)(l) (West Supp. 2008) ("[A]ny person who participates in an act of sodomy with
another person who is under eighteen years of age" has committed sodomy which "is sexual
conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another person.
Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy."); id. §
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Finally, modeling sexual offender statutes on the stereotypical sexual
predator may have a perverse effect of reducing the effectiveness of the
criminal law in some significant number of cases. Most abusers are not
strangers to their victims. 22 4 Many are family members or trusted friends.225
Imagine the dilemma that family members face when they discover that
granddad has been molesting his granddaughter. They may be hesitant to
expose granddad, granddaughter, and themselves to public humiliation
associated with a prosecution for sexual abuse.226 Even if they report the
crime, they may lose the will to cooperate with the police when they
discover the severity of punishment that their family member may face.227
While family members may favor some state intervention, bringing the full
force of current sexual offender statutes to bear may lead the family to lose
their nerve.
V.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS ABOUT CRIMINAL
SENTENCING

The legislative response to sexual crimes is a subset of a larger problem.
Legislatures in many states, like California, have responded to each crime

290(c) (including among the persons required to register "[a]ny person who ... has been...
convicted of ... any act punishable under Section 286"). The registration requirement poses
additional dangers for the offender. His failure to register, even under circumstances where the
police know of his location and where he may have recently registered, but is now required to
reregister, is criminal, exposing the offender to additional criminal sanctions. See ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3824(A) (2001) (stating that the failure to register is a class four felony); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.018(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2008) (stating that the failure to register is a
misdemeanor if the original conviction is a misdemeanor or a felony if the underlying crime was
a felony). That is the case despite the view of some courts that the failure to register or reregister
is one of the most passive of all felonies. People v. Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 369 (Ct.
App. 2005) (remanding the case for resentencing after finding that a recidivist sentence imposed
for the failure to meet this purely technical requirement was grossly disproportionate to the
offense and thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
224. SNYDER, supra note 132, at 10 (finding that 86.3% of all sexual assault victims and
ninety-three percent of juvenile sexual assault victims knew their offender).
225. Id. (finding that 26.7% of sexual assault victims were abused by a family member).
226. See Logan, supra note 197, at 345 (discussing whether "the significant burdens" of
registration laws "might have the perverse effect of discouraging the reporting of sex crimes"
and that "[t]his concern would appear especially justified in cases of nonstranger victimizations,
incest in particular").
227. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 65, at 1244 (discussing the reasons for a victim's
withdrawal from pressing charges, including wanting to "avoid the ordeal of court" (twenty-four
percent of victims studied) and wanting to "avoid sending a person to jail" (fourteen percent of
victims studied)).
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"du jour" by passing sentence enhancements, creating new crimes (like
car jacking, 229 even though the conduct already violated a number of
substantive provisions), and enacting mandatory minimum sentences for a
variety of offenses.230 In California, the problem has been compounded
when those laws pass through the initiative process,21 especially when
legislative reform requires a supermajority. 2 2 This approach to the crime
problem over the past decades contributed to massive increases in the
number of prisons and prisoners in the United States. For example, "in just
thirty years, from 1970 to 2000, the prison population increased more than
500 percent even though the nation's total population rose only about 35

228. According to a report by the Little Hoover Commission, over 1,000 crime bills passed
in California between 1984 and 1991. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, PUTING VIOLENCE BEHIND
BARS: REDEFINING THE ROLE OF CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS (1994), available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/124rp.html.
Many of these statutes imposed sentence
enhancements and were introduced in reaction to exaggerated stories in the media. Id.; see also
Prentky et al., supra note 175, at xii ("Many of the significant legislative reforms of the 1990s
had their beginnings in public outrage over specific instances of sexual violence. Driven far
more by public sentiment than science, the reforms have ... constituted a new public policy
characterized by an aggressive, empirically uninformed stance toward sexual violence. This
public policy has shaped all aspects of the management of sexual offenders ....
229. CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 (West 1999).
230. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-604 (Supp. 2007) (mandatory sentencing
enhancements for some "dangerous" and repeat offenders); id. § 13-701 (2001) (mandatory
minimum sentencing depending on felony class); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (West
1999 & 2004) (mandatory sentencing for certain repeat offenders).
231. California's three strikes law is one example. § § 667, 1170.12. Fueled by public panic,
three strikes "sailed through" the Legislature with no "serious rational discourse or legislative
compromise." Vitiello, supra note 123, at 410 (discussing the major propaganda campaign
following several high-publicity crimes that resulted in the passing of the initiative). Another
example, Proposition 83, was passed in the 2006 California general election. See CAL. SEC'Y OF
STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE GENERAL
ELECTION HELD ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2006, THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON
STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES SUBMITTED TO A VOTE OF ELECTORS, at xviii (2006),
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2006-general/sum-amended.pdf. It provides for GPS
tracking and changes the existing two-year involuntary civil commitment for sexually violent
predators to an indeterminate commitment subject to annual review pursuant to Jessica's Law.
See Shane Goldmacher, Jessica's Law's No-Live Zone Is Bone of PoliticalContention, CAPITOL
WKLY., July 13, 2006, available at http://www.capitolweekly.net/search.php (search for article
title using the "Title contains" box; then select hyperlink) (arguing that the residency restrictions
of Proposition 83 would be problematic in a large city such as San Francisco where there are
very few remaining areas available for sex offenders to live and naming this restriction as the
source of "a fierce and partisan battle in the Capitol"). There was little statewide opposition to
the measure, but Assembly Member Mark Leno, representing San Francisco, argued against the
residency restriction preventing convicted sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a park
or school as "arbitrary, ineffective and unenforceable." Id.
232. See Vitiello, supra note 123, at 457 ("The primary difficulty with political reform is
that alternative legislation will require a supermajority.").
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' In some jurisdictions, like California, these developments have
percent."233
led to massive and unconstitutional prison crowding. 4
Perhaps not surprising in light of the breadth of the problem, many
commentators across the political spectrum have called for reform.235
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy captured the view of many when
he declared that "our punishments [are] too severe [and] our sentences [are]
too long., 23 6 The American Bar Association's Justice Kennedy
Commission, 237 the Little Hoover Commission, 238 and the Deukmejian
Independent Review Panel239 join a number of other groups and
commentators in calling for a variety of reforms to the prison system.24° In
addition, litigation brought on behalf of prison inmates in California has
kept the pressure on lawmakers in California to reform its prison system.4

233.

HENRY RUTH

RESPONSE

& KEVIN R.

REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME:

RETHINKING OUR

3-4 (2003).

234. See Solomon Moore, New Court to Address CaliforniaPrison Crowding, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2007, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/us/24calif.html
(discussing the recent order by two federal judges "to create a three-judge court that will be
charged with reducing the number of state inmates").
235. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, California Officials to Discuss Prison
Conditions, Sentencing and Rehabilitation Issues with American Bar Association Commission
(Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news040204.html; Press
Release, Little Hoover Comm'n, Commission Urges Immediate Action on Corrections Crisis
(Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/185/PressReleasel85.pdf, Press
Release, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces Governor Deukmejian Will Lead an
Independent Review Panel for Corrections Reform (Mar. 5, 2004), available at
www.schwarzenegger.com/en/news/uptotheminute/news-upto-en-duke-reform.asp?sec=news
&subsec-uptotheminute; Anthony M. Kennedy, Keynote Address at the American Bar
at
available
9,
2003),
(Aug.
Meeting
Annual
Association
http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomm/amkspeech03.html.
236. Kennedy, supra note 235. Concern about mandatory minimum sentences may explain,
in part, the Supreme Court's curious decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
The Court invalidated two subsections of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, making the
guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. Id. at 245-46, 258-61.

237.

JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N,

AM.

BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/kencomnim/rep 121 a.pdf.
238. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 228.
239. CORR. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW, REFORMING CALIFORNIA'S
at
available
(2004),
SYSTEM
CORRECTIONAL
ADULT
AND
YOUTH
http://cpr.ca.gov/report/indrpt/corr/.
240. See, e.g., RUTH & REITZ, supra note 233, at 92-117. The issue of sentencing
commissions is currently before an American Law Institute committee. MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).

241. See Brandon Bailey & Steven Harmon, Judge Panel May Cap State Prison
http://www.insidebayarea.com/
2007,
24,
July
TRIB.,
Population, OAKLAND
oaklandtribune/localnews/ci_6449822 (discussing the inmates' lawsuits and the increasing
dissatisfaction and annoyance with the current prison situation). In one attempt to deal with the
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Elsewhere, many commentators have advanced proposals for reform.242
Many of those include the use of a sentencing commission, often modeled
on highly successful Commissions in states like North Carolina and Ohio.243

Not a panacea, 244 a sentencing commission can rationalize the prison
resources through smart sentencing practices, based, in part, on the
collection of good data.24 5 Smart sentencing practices can lead to lower

crime rates and more sensible use of prison resources.246
crises, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 900, increasing spending for prisons. See
Assemb. 900, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
242. See, e.g., RUTH & REITZ, supra note 233, at 106-17 (discussing "seven principal
recommendations" for a more "knowledge-driven and fact-based" incarceration policy); Marie
Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1693 (2006); Kathryne Tafolla Young, Note, The Privatizationof California Correctional
Facilities:A Population-BasedApproach, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 438 (2007). An especially
intriguing proposal, in effect in some states, requires the Commission to publish a cost estimate
when representatives propose changes to sentencing provisions. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §
74-9101(b)(8) (Supp. 2006) (requiring the Kansas Sentencing Commission to "prepare and
submit [a] fiscal impact and correctional resource statement"); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §
6-212(3) (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring the State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy to
"prepare statements containing fiscal and statistical information on proposed legislation
affecting sentencing and corrections practice"); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(8) (2003) (requiring
the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to "make recommendations regarding projected
correctional facilities capacity requirements and related correctional resource needs").
243. See Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of
California'sSentencing Practiceand Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 959-64 (2004); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING

introductory cmt. at xxx-xxxi (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)

(noting the success of comprehensive sentencing reforms in North Carolina and Ohio and
recommending that "every state ... charter a permanent sentencing commission with authority
to promulgate sentencing guidelines, using successful state systems as salutary models and
avoiding the defects of the federal system").
244. For example, the Federal Sentencing Commission model is widely criticized as
ineffective. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING foreword at xiii (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (stating that the federal sentencing guideline system "receives fewer accolades from
experts than most state systems"); RUTH & REITZ, supra note 233, at 107 ("The current federal
system ... has many fierce detractors-including large numbers of U.S. District Court Judges
who must regularly apply the federal guidelines.").
245. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING introductory cmt. at xxxiii-xxxiv (noting that
one advantage of a sentencing commission is "[t]he ability to make accurate predictions of
future sentencing patterns, in the aggregate and line-by-line by offense type"); RUTH & REITZ,
supra note 233, at 107 (discussing how Sentencing Commissions in several states have "brought
new powers of rationality, planning, and oversight to punishment practices" and that they
"monitor sentencing patterns to assess how the guidelines are working" and "perform a variety
of research tasks").
246. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING introductory cmt. at xxxiii-xxxiv (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007) (discussing "[t]he advantages of a well-designed commission-guidelines
sentencing system" including slower rates of prison growth and credible fiscal-impact
forecasting); RUTH & REITZ, supra note 233, at 115 (discussing the "highly accurate" financial
projections prepared by some State Sentencing Commissions which influence policy decisions);
DON STEMEN, ANDRES RENGIFO & JAMES WILSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OF FRAGMENTATION
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California is proving the clich6 that "the devil is in the details" to be true.
Both Governor Schwarzenegger and Democratic legislators have endorsed a
Sentencing Commission for California.247 Despite the pressure from the
federal courts and agreement between the Governor and legislators that
California should have a Commission, they are at a stalemate concerning
the powers of the Commission.2 48 In addition, even many Democrats have
taken California's three strikes legislation off the table, if the State adopts a
commission model.249 Surprisingly, one opportunity to reach a political
compromise passed when Democrats almost unanimously passed Assembly
Bill 900, authorizing additional prison construction.25° Some critics of the
bill saw it as a chance to enact wholesale reform legislation.251
19752002, at 143 (2005), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/213003.pdf ("We
consistently found that states with the combination of determinate sentencing and presumptive
sentencing guidelines have lower incarceration rates than other states . . . Further, the
combination of the two policies was also associated with smaller growth in incarceration
rates.").
247. California State Senator Gloria Romero is pushing hardest, along with Assembly
Member Sally Lieber. Both have introduced legislation creating an independent Sentencing
Commission charged with devising criminal sentencing guidelines. See Frank D. Russo,
California Sentencing Reform Bill to be Voted on Today by State Assembly, CAL. PROGRESS
REP., June 6, 2007, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2007/06/californiasent.html
(discussing Lieber's bill, Assembly Bill 160); Frank D. Russo, Politics or a Post-Partisan
Approach to Prisons?A Sentencing Commission with Teeth Independent of the Department of
Corrections
Is
the
Answer,
CAL.
PROGRESS
REP.,
Jan.
19,
2007,
http://www.californiaprogressreport.corn2007/01/politics-or-a-p.html
(discussing Romero's
bill, Senate Bill 110).
248. Those who endorse the reforms recognize that the specifics of the Sentencing
Commission could "bog down" the plan. Andy Furillo, Governor's Prison Plan Spelled Out,
AND FERMENT: THE IMPACT OF STATE SENTENCING POLICIES ON INCARCERATION RATES,

SACRAMENTO

BEE,

Dec.

22,

2006,

http://www.sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2007/Jan2OO7/news1O.pdf. Much of the
debate has centered on "whether the commission would be advisory or have a direct voice in
establishing a new sentencing structure for the state." Id.
249. See Andy Furillo, State Sentencing Bill Advances, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 11, 2007,
at A4, available at http://www.sacbee.com/l 1/story/153014.html ("'[N]obody's talking about
three strikes' in the ongoing discussion of a California sentencing commission .... ." (quoting
Kara Dansky, Executive Director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center)); Sasha Abramsky,
California
Dreaming,
http://conmmentisfree.guardian.co.uk/sasha-abramsky/2007/05/throwing-good-Money-after-ba
d.html (May 4, 2007, 7:30 AM) ("Fearful of appearing soft on crime, Democrats in the
legislature agreed to water down their proposals for diverting people away from prison.").
250. CAL. ASSEMB. FLOOR UNOFFICIAL BALLOT FOR ASSEMB. 900, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (search for bill number 900 in the 2007-2008 session;
then follow "AB 900" hyperlink; then follow "Assembly Floor - 04/26/2007" hyperlink under
"Votes"); CAL. S. FLOOR UNOFFICIAL BALLOT FOR ASSEMB. 900, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (search for bill number 900 in the 2007-2008 session;
then follow "AB 900" hyperlink; then follow "Senate Floor - 04/26/2007" hyperlink under
"Votes"). The bill does make a very modest beginning towards reform. It earmarks $50 million
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Reforming sexual offender provisions should be folded into sentencing
reform where that is on the table, as in California. As argued above,
sentencing authorities can now make evidence and needs-based sentencing
decisions that increase the utility of prison resources.252 Data demonstrates
that many of the resources devoted to sex offenders are unnecessary for
social protection.25 While virtually every legislator fears being labeled as
soft on crime,254 acts of political courage do occur.255 Reforming the laws
that govern sexual offenders is certainly one area where we need politicians
(or courts) to show courage to achieve meaningful reform.

for rehabilitation programs.

CAL. S. RULE COMM., BILL ANALYSIS OF ASSEMB. 900, at 2,
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (search for bill number 900 in the 20072008 session; then follow "AB 900" hyperlink; then follow "Assembly Floor - 04/26/2007"
hyperlink under "Analyses"). It also provides for funds for "re-entry beds," to stop the current
practice of turning prisoners back on the street with nowhere to go and with $200 in their
pocket. Id. at 3.
251. See Andy Furillo, Governor Signs Prison Bill, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 3, 2007,
availableat http://www.sacbee.com/111/story/166239.html ("Opponents of the bill said.., that
the administration missed a chance to incorporate a major sentencing overhaul and parole
changes into the package ....").According to California State Senator Gloria Romero, it is
"'unworkable, untenable and sets us back instead of moving us forward."' Id. (quoting Senator
Romero).
252. See supra notes 180-182, 245-46 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
254. No doubt that this is especially acute in the case of sexual predators. Imagine a
politician's fear that a sexual offender on early release will commit a violent sexual offense
against a minor.
255. Oddly, legislators do not seem to take much comfort in studies that show that the
public endorses shorter sentences for many offenders. See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS.,
CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1 (2002), http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles-publications/publications/hartpoll20020201/Hart-Poll.pdf ("Support for long prison sentences as the primary tool in the fight
against crime is waning ....The public now favors dealing with the roots of crime over strict
sentencing by a two to one margin, 65% to 32%.").

